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Reforming the Supreme Court 
Appointment Process, 2004-2014:  
A 10-Year Democratic Audit
*
 
Adam M. Dodek
**
 
The way in which Justice Rothstein was appointed marks an historic 
change in how we appoint judges in this country. It brought 
unprecedented openness and accountability to the process. The 
hearings allowed Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein through 
their members of Parliament in a way that was not previously 
possible.
1
 
— The Rt. Hon. Stephen Harper, PC 
[J]udicial appointments … [are] a critical part of the administration of 
justice in Canada … This is a legacy issue, and it will live on long 
after those who have the temporary stewardship of this position are 
no longer there. If the act of appointing judges is a priority, the 
process of appointing them is no less so. Indeed, the integrity and 
                                                                                                             
* This paper is dedicated to Professor Emeritus Jacob Ziegel of the University of Toronto’s 
Faculty of Law. I know of no one who cares more passionately about the importance of the Supreme 
Court of Canada appointment process. In appreciation. 
** Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa. Exceptional research assistance was provided 
by Emily Alderson, J.D. 2015 (expected). Thanks to Stephen Bindman, Ian Greene, Carissima 
Mathen, Peter Russell, Nadia Verrelli and two anonymous reviewers for reading earlier drafts and 
providing helpful comments. This paper was presented as part of the Osgoode Constitutional 
Cases Conference in April 2014. Appreciation to my co-panellists Hugo Cyr, Rosemary Cairns 
Way and Bruce Ryder, and to David Schneiderman and Dahlia Lithwick for helpful questions. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at forums sponsored by the University of Ottawa’s 
Public Law Group on Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada in October 2011 and on the 
Supreme Court of Canada in February 2013. Research for this study was funded by the Social 
Science and Humanities Research Council. 
1 News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein 
to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/03/01/prime-
minister-announces-appointment-mr-justice-marshall-rothstein-supreme-court>. 
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fairness of the process is not unrelated to the excellence and 
independence of the judiciary.
2
 
— The Hon. Irwin Cotler, PC, OC, QC (Minister of Justice  
and Attorney General of Canada, 2003–2006) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As Irwin Cotler stated above, judicial appointments matter. They 
matter because Supreme Court of Canada judges exercise important 
functions not only in the administration of justice but also in Canadian 
democracy: the Supreme Court is a critical institution in our society. As 
Prime Minister Harper declared, the process by which our high court 
judges are appointed also matters. It matters for the Supreme Court but 
also for the other branches of government: the executive and the legisla-
tive (i.e., Parliament). The recent appointment of Justice Nadon raises 
serious questions about that appointment process that deserve attention. 
On October 22, 2013, the Governor-in-Council directed a reference 
to the Supreme Court of Canada regarding the eligibility of Justice Marc 
Nadon to be appointed to that Court
3
 and introduced legislation in an 
omnibus budget bill to clarify that federal court judges were qualified for 
                                                                                                             
2 Irwin Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process: Chronology, Context and 
Reform” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 131, at 131 [hereinafter “Cotler, ‘The Supreme Court Appointment 
Process’”]. To the same effect, see Shimon Shetreet & Sophie Turenne, Judges on Trial: The 
Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 102: “In any system, the methods of appointment have direct bearing on 
both the integrity and independence of the judges. Weak appointments lower the status of the 
judiciary in the eyes of the public and create a climate in which the necessary independence of the 
judiciary is liable to be undermined. Similarly, political appointments that are seen by the public as 
not based on merit may arouse concern about the judge’s independence and impartiality on the 
bench.” 
3 Order in Council P.C. 2013-1105. This reference asked the Supreme Court to answer 
two questions: (1) “Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years standing at the 
Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada as a member of the Supreme Court 
from Quebec pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act?”; and (2) “Can Parliament 
enact legislation that requires that a person be or has previously been a barrister or advocate of at 
least 10 years standing at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment as a judge of the 
Supreme Court of Canada or enact the annexed declaratory provisions as set out in clauses 471 and 
472 of the Bill entitled Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No.2?” The Supreme Court heard the 
reference on an abridged timetable on January 15, 2014 and issued its decision (technically an 
“advisory opinion”) on March 21, 2014. See Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 21, 2014 SCC 21 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Supreme Court Reference”]. See generally Justice 
Canada, Press Release, “Government of Canada Takes Steps to Clarify Certain Eligibility Criteria 
for Supreme Court Justices”, October 22, 2013, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ 
nr-cp/2013/doc_32973.html>.  
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appointment under the Supreme Court Act for the three seats designated 
for Quebec.
4
 Less than a month before, on September 30, 2013, the 
Prime Minister had announced Justice Nadon as his “nominee” to replace 
Justice Morris Fish as one of the three Quebec judges on the Supreme 
Court.
5
 Two days later, on October 2, 2013, Justice Nadon appeared 
before a committee of Members of Parliament (“MPs”) for what has 
become known colloquially as “a parliamentary hearing”.6 The next day 
the Prime Minister confirmed his selection of Justice Nadon.
7
 On 
October 7, 2013, Justice Nadon was officially sworn in as a member of 
the Supreme Court of Canada.
8
 Later that day, Toronto lawyer Rocco 
Galati launched a challenge to Justice Nadon’s appointment in the 
Federal Court of Canada.
9
 On October 8, 2013, the Supreme Court 
announced that Justice Nadon would not participate in matters before the 
Supreme Court in light of the challenge to his appointment.
10
 Justice 
Nadon and the Supreme Court were placed in limbo for the next  
five months until the Court’s decision on March 21, 2014, which 
declared his appointment to be void ab initio and the government’s 
legislative amendments ultra vires.
11
  
                                                                                                             
4 See Bill C-4, A second act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in 
Parliament on March 21, 2013 and other measures (Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2), S.C. 
2013, c. 40), ss. 471 and 472. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26. 
5 Press Release, “PM Announces Nominee for the Supreme Court of Canada”, September 30, 
2013, online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/09/30/pm-announces-nominee-supreme-court-canada>. 
6 The Committee is not, strictly speaking, a “parliamentary committee”. Rather, it is a 
“committee of parliamentarians”. As discussed infra in Part II, this is a distinction with a difference. 
The committee is composed of MPs but it is created not by Parliament, but by the executive, and 
therefore it is not subject to the rules of Parliament, including parliamentary privilege. This 
distinction is discussed in note 235 regarding MP Joe Comartin’s comments regarding Rothstein J. at 
the October 2011 hearings for Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis. 
7 See Order in Council P.C. 2013-1050, referenced in Supreme Court Reference, supra, 
note 3, at para. 9. 
8 Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, October 7, 2013, online: <http://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/4399/index.do>. 
9 Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 9; Galati et al. v. The Right Honourable 
Stephen Harper et al., Federal Court of Canada, File No. T-1657-13. See Sean Fine, “Justice Nadon 
steps aside from Supreme Court until legal challenge resolved” The Globe and Mail (October 8, 
2013), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/supreme-court-justices-appointment-
challenged-in-court/article14743436>.  
10 Supreme Court of Canada, News Release, October 8, 2013, online: <http:// 
scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/4401/index.do>; Sean Fine, “Justice Nadon steps aside 
while legal challenge heard” The Globe and Mail (October 9, 2013) A3; Tobi Cohen, “Supreme 
Court appointment challenged; Judicial review; Activist lawyer argues Nadon not qualified” 
National Post (October 9, 2013) A5. 
11 Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3. 
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At the moment that Rocco Galati brought his legal challenge, it 
should have been apparent that the appointment process had failed, at 
least to the extent that it is supposed to serve a vetting function. Only 
seven days had elapsed between the time that the Prime Minister an-
nounced Justice Nadon as his nominee on Monday, September 30, 2013 
and Justice Nadon’s swearing in as a Supreme Court justice on Monday, 
October 7, 2013.  
The appointment process failed to adequately address the issue of 
whether Justice Nadon was qualified for appointment to the high court 
under the Supreme Court Act.
12
 This is obvious. However, the appoint-
ment process failed in at least three other respects. First, it constituted a 
failure of transparency in several ways. The controversy following Jus-
tice Nadon’s appointment raised many unanswered questions about how 
the appointments process operated: what were the qualifications upon 
which candidates were selected and evaluated? How did the Minister of 
Justice choose the so-called “long list” of candidates to be considered? 
How many candidates were on this “long list”? How did the Supreme 
Court Selection Panel operate? What was its mandate from the Minister 
of Justice? How did the members decide on the recommendations for the 
shortlist? Consensus? Unanimity? Majority vote?
13
  
The appointment process also failed to produce accountability.  
Neither the Minister of Justice nor the Prime Minister provided an ade-
quate explanation of why they selected Justice Nadon for this important 
post. This was unfair both to Justice Nadon and to the Canadian people. 
The accountability failure is connected to the transparency failure: in the 
absence of identifying the criteria for selection, it becomes impossible to 
explain how a candidate meets those unknown criteria.
14
  
Many questions have been raised about the Nadon appointment and 
the Supreme Court Reference will no doubt be the subject of much dis-
cussion for years to come. It is not my intention or desire to dissect those 
                                                                                                             
12 See Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, ss. 4-5. 
13 We have learned more about the operation of the appointment process for Justice Nadon 
through the Government’s response to Order Questions submitted by Irwin Cotler, MP and Stéphane 
Dion in 2014. See Order Paper Question 73, House of Commons, Sessional Paper, 8555-412-74; 
Order Paper Question 239, House of Commons, Sessional Paper 8555-412-239. 
14 Cf. Carissima Mathen, “Choices and Controversy: Judicial Appointments in Canada” 
(2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 52, at 71 [hereinafter “Mathen, ‘Choices and Controversy’”]: “The lack of 
clarity around the most important criteria for our highest judges is unacceptable and demands 
sustained and serious thought.” 
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issues here.
15
 Rather, the Nadon appointment provides a useful vantage 
point to gaze back and evaluate the changes to the Supreme Court  
appointment process over the past decade.
16
 
Thus, this paper analyzes the Supreme Court appointment process 
over the 10-year period from 2004 through the end of 2013. The year 
2004 has been selected because the vacancies caused by the departures of 
Justices Iacobucci and Arbour in that year led to the beginning of a dec-
ade of reforms to the appointment process. The changes begun by Liberal 
Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler in 2004 led to further reforms by the 
Conservative government when it took office in 2006. Between 2004 and 
2013, eight Supreme Court Justices have been appointed under variants 
of a reformed appointment system: Rosalie Silverman Abella and Louise 
Charron (2004), Marshall Rothstein (2006), Thomas Cromwell (2008), 
Michael Moldaver and Andromache Karakatsanis (2011), Richard Wagner 
(2012) and Marc Nadon (2013).
17
 In 2014, Justice LeBel is scheduled to 
retire and we can anticipate a similar process being used as in the past 
three appointments by Prime Minister Harper.  
This paper conducts a democratic audit
18
 of the Supreme Court 
appointment process
19
 and not an evaluation of the judges appointed 
                                                                                                             
15 On the issues before the Court in the Supreme Court Reference, see Michael Plaxton & 
Carissima Mathen, “Purposive Interpretation, Quebec, and the Supreme Court Act” (2013) 22:3 
Const. Forum 15 (cited in the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3, at para. 58); Paul Daly, 
“More on Section 6 of the Supreme Court Act: Legislative History and Purpose”, Administrative 
Law Matters (October 16, 2013), online: <http://administrativelawmatters.blogspot.ca/2013/10/more- 
on-section-6-of-supreme-court-act.html>; House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and 
Human Rights, 41st Parl., 2nd Sess., Tuesday November 19, 2013 (Evidence), online: <http://www. 
parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=6307059&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&
Ses=2>; and Thursday November 21, 2013, online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication. 
aspx?DocId=6317974&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl=41&Ses=2>. 
16 I do not think it is too early to conduct a retrospective of the reforms despite admonitions 
to the contrary. As my colleague Carissima Mathen relates, Justice Rothstein was asked at his 
hearing whether he thought the process was a good one. He replied: “You’re asking me whether I 
think this is a good process. The question reminds me of a story. They say that shortly after the 
Communist revolution in 1949 one of the Chinese leaders was asked whether he thought the French 
Revolution was a success. His answer was that it was too early to tell. Perhaps I have to say it’s too 
early to tell.” Parliament of Canada, Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee for the Supreme Court 
of Canada (February 27, 2006), quoted by Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 
53, note 9. 
17 The Supreme Court declared the appointment of Justice Nadon to the Supreme Court to be 
void ab initio in the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3. However, the appointment is still 
considered for purposes of evaluating the reforms to the appointment system between 2004 and 2013. 
18 As discussed in Part III, infra, I take the concept of a “democratic audit” from William 
Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006) vii, at vii. 
19 I do not address the changes made by Minister of Justice Vic Toews in 2006 to the 
Judicial Advisory Committees (“JACs”) that screen the pool of candidates for other federal 
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through this process. Evaluating Supreme Court judges for their 
supposed “merit” is an exercise fraught with difficulty, not the least 
because of its subjectivity.
20
 It may also be more a matter of taste or 
judgment than objective criteria.
21
 Moreover, as I discuss in Part III, the 
process has largely failed to publicly articulate the criteria upon which 
the judges are selected.
22
 In the absence of an articulation of the criteria 
for appointment, those selected cannot be evaluated based on unknown 
criteria. Thus, instead of evaluating the judges, I evaluate the process 
used to select them through the idea of a democratic audit. 
This paper has five parts in addition to this introduction. Part II 
presents a short history of the Supreme Court appointments process 
                                                                                                             
appointments. See Department of Justice Canada, Press Release, “Minister Toews pleased to 
announce changes to Judicial Advisory Committees” (November 10, 2006); Canadian Judicial 
Council, News Release, “Canadian Judicial Council calls on government to consult on proposed 
changes” (November 9, 2006); Canadian Judicial Council, Press Release, “Judicial Appointments: 
Perspective from the Canadian Judicial Council” (February 27, 2007); Canadian Bar Association, 
News Release, “CBA Says Recent Changes to the Judicial Appointment Process Must Be Reversed” 
(March 20, 2007); Canadian Association of Law Teachers, Press Release, “Canadian Association of 
Law Teachers Reiterate its Position Concerning Reforms to Federal Judicial Appointments and 
Criticizes Reforms Recently Envisaged by the Federal Minister of Justice” (November 29, 2006); 
Rainer Knopff, “The Politics of Reforming Judicial Appointments” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 44; F.C. 
DeCoste, “Howling at Harper” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 121; Peter Russell, “An Error of Judgment” 
The Globe and Mail (February 27, 2007) A21. On the pre-reformed s. 96 appointment process, see 
E. Neil McKelvey, “Foreword: Appointment of Section 96 Judges” (2008) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 5. See 
generally Canadian Bar Association, Report of the Canadian Bar Association Committee on the 
Appointment of Judges in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Foundation, 1985). 
20 Cf. Allan C. Hutchinson, “Looking for the Good Judge: Merit and Ideology” [hereinafter 
“Hutchinson”] in Nadia Verrelli, ed., The Democratic Dilemma: Reforming Canada’s Supreme Court 
(Montreal & Kingston: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, 2013) 99 [hereinafter “Verrelli”]. 
21 Because of the nature of the work of the Supreme Court — a limited caseload, a long lag 
time between hearings and decisions, the collegial nature of decision-making — I do not think that 
one can begin to judge a Supreme Court judge until she or he has spent five years on the high court. 
Thus, I think The Globe and Mail’s negative assessment of Justice Karakatsanis one year after her 
appointment was grossly unfair. See Editorial, “Weak process for weighty choices” The Globe and 
Mail (April 4, 2013) A16 (characterizing Justice Karakatsanis as “struggling to make an impact” and 
being “a long way from pulling her judicial weight” because she had only written three decisions in 
her 18 months on the high court). For responses, see Patrick LeSage & Susan Lang, “Both merit 
praise” The Globe and Mail (April 5, 2013) A16: “We disagree with your criticism, both direct and 
indirect, concerning the contributions of Justice Karakatsanis. … A judge’s contributions should not 
be measured on the basis of the number of judgments written, particularly in an appellate court 
where collegial decision-making and judgment-writing are so important”; Morris Chochla, 
“Unwarranted” The Globe and Mail (April 10, 2013) A16: “Supreme Court Justice Andromache 
Karakatsanis has superb qualifications and accomplishments. … Your criticism of Justice 
Karakatsanis is unwarranted.” 
22 An exception was Minister of Justice and Attorney General Irwin Cotler, who in 2004 
publicly articulated the criteria upon which candidates were identified for the “long list” and the 
criteria used to select the ultimate nominees for appointment. See infra , at 120-21. 
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between 2004 and 2013. It sets out the mechanisms under which each of 
the eight judicial appointments was made during this period.
23
 Part III 
introduces the concept of a democratic audit and identifies the drivers of 
change to the appointments process. It argues that prior to 1992 proposed 
reforms to the Supreme Court amendment process were motivated by 
concerns about federalism: incorporating a role for the provinces in the 
appointment process. However, after the failure of the Charlottetown 
Accord (1992), the motivation changed to concerns about the “democratic 
deficit” so that reforming the Supreme Court appointment process became 
part of a democratic reform agenda proposed first by the opposition 
Reform Party, then by Liberal leader Paul Martin, both in his leadership 
campaign and during his tenure as Prime Minister, and finally by the 
Conservative Party led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper. This part also 
addresses an issue that did not factor into the reforms: any perceived 
deficiency in the quality of past appointments or concerns about the 
legitimacy of the Supreme Court itself. Since 1992, the key factors that 
were articulated as the basis for changing the appointment process have 
been (1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) public knowledge about 
the Supreme Court and its judges. These are the factors that I use for 
evaluation through this democratic audit.  
In Part IV, I conduct the democratic audit and find that the reforms have 
largely failed to deliver on the promised transparency and accountability. 
Conversely, I also conclude that the reforms have been very successful in 
serving a public education function about the Supreme Court and the work 
that Supreme Court judges do. Part V offers my recommendations for “re-
forming the reforms” in order to achieve the goals of transparency and 
accountability in the appointment process. I argue that the government 
should publish a detailed protocol to be styled Guide to Appointment of Su-
preme Court Justices, which would set out the qualifications, consultation to 
be followed, procedure for evaluation, etc. I propose a revamped advisory 
committee which would operate in a more open and transparent fashion and 
produce a report on their work. The public hearings of nominees should con-
tinue, but only if the Minister of Justice also appears to answer questions 
about the process and about why the nominee was selected. Finally, the pa-
per ends with a brief conclusion in Part VI.
24
 
                                                                                                             
23 There are actually only six appointment “events” to be evaluated since there were double 
appointments in both 2004 (Abella and Charron) and 2011 (Karakatsanis and Moldaver). 
24 This paper was written just after the Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3 and prior to 
the release of the Reference re Senate Reform, [2014] S.C.J. No. 32, 2014 SCC 32 (S.C.C.). It thus 
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II. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT  
APPOINTMENT PROCESS, 2004-2013 
The 10-year period between 2004 and the end of 2013 produced 
more changes to the appointment process for Supreme Court judges than 
any period since the Court was created in 1875. Reform of the Supreme 
Court appointment process began when Paul Martin became Prime  
Minister in December 2002. As discussed below in this Part, Martin had 
made reform of the Supreme Court appointment process part of his  
Democratic Action Plan, both as a candidate to succeed Jean Chrétien as 
the leader of the Liberal Party in 2002 and then as Prime Minister in 2003. 
The changes were first implemented with the surprise announcements by 
Justices Frank Iacobucci and Louise Arbour in the spring of 2004 that they 
both intended to step down from the Court at the end of June.
25
  
Prior to 2004, the appointment process was closed, secretive and 
largely unknown and unknowable to the vast majority of Canadians.
26
 
More was known about the process for electing a new Pope than about 
the process for selecting a new Supreme Court justice. While vacancies 
were publicly known — through the public announcement of a justice’s 
retirement or, as in the case of Justice Sopinka, by a sudden death — no 
information was publicly available about the selection process. The lack 
of transparency caused some to believe that the process was partisan,
27
 
understandably so since lack of information will lead to speculation, and 
speculation about politics naturally leads to pondering about partisanship 
                                                                                                             
does not consider the implications of these decisions on substantive reforms to the Supreme Court 
amendment process. That issue is deserving of a separate, independent paper. 
25 See Steven Edwards, “Arbour nomination confirmed: Supreme Court justice to be UN 
Rights Commissioner” Ottawa Citizen (February 21, 2004) A3 and Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme 
Court judge Iacobucci to retire; Two Ontario seats now open on bench Martin break replacement 
promise” The Toronto Star (March 23, 2004) A6. Both announcements came as a surprise because 
Justice Iacobucci could have served on the Court until 2012 and Justice Arbour until 2022. Justice 
Iacobucci had served on the high court for 13 years and the announcement of his departure was less 
surprising than that of Justice Arbour, who had served on the Court for less than five years at the time 
she announced her resignation. See The Supreme Court of Canada, “The Honourable Mr. Justice  
Frank Iacobucci”, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id 
=frank-iacobucci> and The Supreme Court of Canada, “The Honourable Madam Justice Louise 
Arbour”, online: <http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca/court-cour/judges-juges/bio-eng.aspx?id=louise-arbour>. 
26 Former Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler admitted that the consultative process for 
Supreme Court appointments was “never well known — indeed, it may be said to have been 
relatively unknown”. Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 136.  
27 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, id. 
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and patronage. Jacob Ziegel rightly described the process as one 
“shrouded in vagueness, and unsubstantiated rumour and gossip”.28  
In March 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before the 
House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights 
examining the Supreme Court appointment process and lifted the shroud 
that had hidden the process from public view for so long.
29
 Minister  
Cotler’s testimony was both historic and illuminating in shining signifi-
cant light on the process.
30
 In his testimony, Cotler explained that 
... what I would like to do now, in the interests of both transparency and 
accountability, is to describe to you the consultative process or protocol 
of consultation that is being used to select members of the Supreme 
Court. I cannot claim, nor would I, that this consultative process or 
protocol has always been followed in every particular. I can only 
undertake to follow it as the protocol by which I will be governed as 
                                                                                                             
28 Jacob S. Ziegel, “Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme 
Court of Canada” (June 1999) 5:2 Choices 3, at 6 [hereinafter “Ziegel, ‘Merit Selection’”]. Ziegel 
posed many questions about the process:  
Obviously, the Minister of Justice is involved and so, we are told, is the Prime Minister’s 
Office, since by convention the Prime Minister makes the actual decision. If that is the 
case, does the Cabinet do more than simply rubber stamp the Prime Minister’s choice? 
What role does the Chief Justice of Canada play? To what extent does the Minister of 
Justice confer with the attorney general or attorneys general of the province or the region 
from which the candidate is to be appointed? What is the role of lobbyists for special  
interests or on behalf of specific candidates? In the Charter era, how much attention does 
the federal government pay to the constitutional philosophy of prospective appointees? 
There are no sure answers to any of these questions.  
Id. If someone as knowledgeable as Professor Ziegel did not know the answers to these questions, 
we can assume that few experts and even fewer members of the public did. 
29 The Committee itself described Cotler’s appearance as “the first time that [the Supreme Court 
appointments process] had been made public. Canadians had their first opportunity to learn who was 
consulted about Supreme Court appointments and the criteria by which candidates are assessed for their 
fitness to be a Justice.” Canada, Report of the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process (Ottawa: 
Communication Group, 2004), at 5 (Chair: Derek Lee, MP), online: Parliament of Canada, 
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId= 1350880&Language=E&Mode= 
1&Parl=37&Ses=3>. See also Peter W. Hogg, “Appointment of Thomas A. Cromwell to the Supreme 
Court of Canada” in J. Cameron, P. Monahan & B. Ryder, eds. (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 413. 
30 My colleague Carissima Mathen was less impressed with Mr. Cotler’s appearance. She 
called the process  
not exactly revealing. The Minister essentially offered assurances that Supreme Court  
appointments were not random. They did not involve the equivalent of the Prime Minister 
picking a name from a legal directory or appointing his favourite bridge partner. Instead, 
the Prime Minister’s Office (through the Minister of Justice) talked with some people 
about other people, gathered some names, looked over anything those people may have 
written, and eventually made a decision. The candidates were not even interviewed. 
Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 57 (citation omitted).  
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Minister of Justice. I might add that this is the first time that this protocol 
or appointments protocol is being released, which I would say is yet 
another expression of the beneficiary of this parliamentary review.  
The first step taken in this appointments process is the identification of 
prospective candidates. As you are aware, candidates come from the region 
where the vacancy originated — be it the Atlantic, Ontario, Quebec, the 
Prairies and the North, and British Columbia regions. This is a matter of 
convention, except for Quebec, where the Supreme Court Act establishes a 
requirement that three of the justices must come from Quebec.  
The candidates are drawn from judges of the courts of jurisdiction in 
the region, particularly the courts of appeal, as well as from senior 
members of the bar and leading academics in the region. Sometimes, 
names may be first identified through previous consultations 
concerning other judicial appointments.  
In particular, Mr. Chairman, the identification and assessment of 
potential candidates is based on a broad range of consultations with 
various individuals. As Minister of Justice, I consult with the 
following: the Chief Justice of Canada and perhaps other members of 
the Supreme Court of Canada, the chief justices of the courts of the 
relevant region, the attorneys general of the relevant region, at least one 
senior member of the Canadian Bar Association, and at least one senior 
member of the law society of the relevant region.  
I may also consider input from other interested persons, such as academics 
and organizations who wish to recommend a candidate for consideration. 
Anyone is free to recommend candidates, and indeed, some will choose to 
do so by way of writing to the Minister of Justice, for example.  
The second step is assessment of the potential candidates. Here, the 
predominant consideration is merit. In consultation with the Prime 
Minister, I use the following criteria, divided into three main categories: 
professional capacity, personal characteristics, and diversity.  
Let me begin with professional capacity. Under the heading of 
professional capacity are the following considerations, and I will just 
cite them: highest level of proficiency in the law, superior intellectual 
ability and analytical and written skills; proven ability to listen and to 
maintain an open mind while hearing all sides of the argument; 
decisiveness and soundness of judgment; capacity to manage and share 
consistently heavy workload in a collaborative context; capacity to 
manage stress and the pressures of the isolation of the judicial role; 
strong cooperative interpersonal skills; awareness of social context; 
bilingual capacity; and specific expertise required for the Supreme 
Court. Expertise can be identified by the court itself or by others.  
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As I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, this goes to what might be called the 
professional capacity. This is the comprehensive set of criteria here. 
Not every candidate must have each of these criteria. This is the 
composite set of criteria through which evaluation takes place. 
[Translation] 
Under the rubric of personal qualities, the following factors are 
considered: impeccable personal and professional ethics, honesty, 
integrity and forthrightness; respect and regard for others, patience, 
courtesy, tact, humility, impartiality and tolerance; personal sense of 
responsibility, common sense, punctuality and reliability. 
The diversity criterion concerns the extent to which the court’s 
composition adequately reflects the diversity of Canadian society. 
[English] 
Mr. Chairman, these are the criteria.  
In reviewing the candidates, I may also consider jurisprudential profiles 
prepared by the Department of Justice. These are intended to provide 
information about the volume of cases written, areas of expertise, the 
outcome of appeals of the cases, and the degree to which they have 
been followed in the lower courts.  
After the above assessments and consultations, as I’ve described, are 
completed, I discuss the candidates with the Prime Minister. There may 
also have been previous exchanges with the Prime Minister. Indeed,  
I may be involved in a consultation more than once with a range of 
persons with whom I’ve indicated that I engaged in consultations.  
A preferred candidate is then chosen. The Prime Minister, in turn, 
recommends a candidate to cabinet and the appointment proceeds by 
way of an order in council appointment, as per the Constitution. 
This concludes the description of the current protocol or appointment 
process, which I’m sharing with you.
31
 
Cotler explained “the old process” at the same time as work was under-
way within government to reform it and create a new process for 
appointing Supreme Court judges. 
Cotler appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee 
on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
                                                                                                             
31 Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., March 30, 2004 (The Hon. Irwin Cotler), reproduced in Cotler, 
“The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2. 
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(“Justice Committee”) because earlier that month Prime Minister Paul 
Martin’s Minister of Democratic Reform, the Honourable Jacques Saada, 
asked that committee for “recommendations on how best to implement 
prior review of Supreme Court of Canada Justices”.32 The Justice Com-
mittee also heard testimony from retired Supreme Court justice Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé and from academics. It produced a report that recom-
mended that as an interim process the Minister of Justice appear before 
the committee to explain both the process followed for filling the vacan-
cies and the qualifications of the two nominees. The committee report 
further recommended a more permanent process involving the creation 
of an advisory committee composed of MPs from each official party, rep-
resentation from the provinces, members of the judiciary, the legal 
profession and lay members which would provide the Minister of Justice 
with a shortlist of candidates for appointment. Again, the Minister of Jus-
tice would appear before the committee to explain both the process and 
the appointee’s qualifications.33 Each of the Conservative Party, Bloc 
Québécois and New Democratic Party (“NDP”) filed dissenting opinions 
to the effect that the recommendations did not go far enough in various 
respects.
34
 
Initially, Prime Minister Martin announced that he intended to give 
MPs a role in screening the nominees that he selected for the Supreme 
Court.
35
 However, with a federal election intervening and pressure on the 
government to have the vacancies filled by the end of the summer, the 
federal government backtracked from its reform plans and put in place an 
                                                                                                             
32 See Letter to Mr. Derek Lee, Chair, House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice, 
Human Rights, Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, March 16, 2004, online: <http://epe.lac-bac. 
gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp@id=121>. 
The letter asked the House Justice Committee to “undertake a review and report to the House of 
Commons with recommendations on this matter as soon as possible. I would ask that you consult 
with the Minister of Justice and parliamentarians from both Chambers as part of this review.” Id. See 
also Office of the Prime Minister, News Release, “Parliament to Review Appointments” (March 16, 
2004), online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/ 301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/ 
www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news.asp@id=119>. The Justice Committee had previously begun looking at the 
appointment process for all judicial appointments pursuant to a motion referred to the Justice 
Committee from the House of Commons originally moved by Bloc Québécois MP and Justice 
Committee member Richard Marceau. See Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 37th Parl., 3rd Sess., March 23, 2004 (Mr. Derek Lee, Chair). 
33 See House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (May 
2004), 37th Parl. 3d Sess. (Mr. Derek Lee, Chair). 
34 Id. 
35 See Janice Tibbetts, “Martin determined to let MPS screen judges” National Post (May 17, 
2004) A4. 
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interim process as recommended by the Justice Committee whereby the 
Prime Minister would select the nominees and the Minister of Justice 
would appear before a committee of MPs.
36
 
Thus, in August 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared be-
fore an interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme 
Court Judges to explain both the process that led to the Prime Minister’s 
selection of Justices Abella and Charron as well as the basis for selecting 
them.
37
 The committee was composed of seven MPs plus a representative 
of the Canadian Judicial Council and the Law Society of Upper  
Canada.
38
 The panel questioned Minister Cotler and prepared a report, 
with dissenting opinions expressed about the process, not the nominees. 
The Prime Minister then formally appointed Justices Abella and Charron 
to the Supreme Court.
39
  
In 2005, Cotler introduced a “permanent reform” process consisting 
of four stages. In the first stage, the Minister was to conduct the same 
sort of consultations and review as in the past with a view to creating a 
“long list” of five to eight candidates. In the second stage, an Advisory 
Committee was to assess the candidates and produce a confidential 
short list of three names “along with a commentary of the strengths and 
                                                                                                             
36 See Kim Lunman & Brian Laghi, “Commons panel to accept judges, but wants stronger 
vetting process” The Globe and Mail (August 26, 2004) A1; Tonda MacCharles, “Naming process 
draws fire; Justice minister to face special hearing today Charron, Abella picked for skills in public, 
private law” The Toronto Star (August 25, 2004) A7; Kim Lunman & Michael Valpy, “MPs will 
scrutinize top-court nominees” The Globe and Mail (August 24, 2004) A1; Kim Lunman, “MPs 
working on hearings for top-court nominees” The Globe and Mail (August 23, 2004) A4. See 
generally Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments: When and 
How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253, at 267 [hereinafter 
“Cotler & Feldman”]. 
37 Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, on 
the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on Supreme Court Appointments, August 24, 
2004, Ottawa, online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116083626/http:// 
www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc_31212.html>. The Minister appeared before an ad 
hoc committee rather than a parliamentary committee because there had been a general election in 
June 2004 and the 37th Parliament was dissolved on May 23, 2004. The 38th Parliament was not 
summoned into session until October 4, 2004. See Parliament of Canada, PARLINFO, Parliaments, 
online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/Lists/Parliament.aspx>. 
38 See Report of the Interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme Court 
Judges, Appendix A, August 2004, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cp-pm/cr-rc/scj2-
jcs2/>. Chief Justice John Richard of the Federal Court of Appeal served as the Canadian Judicial 
Council’s representative and Julian Porter served as the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 
representative. See also Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 267-68. 
39 See Report of the Interim Ad Hoc Committee on the Appointment of Supreme Court 
Judges, Appendix A, id., and Kim Lunman, “Top-court nominees endorsed – but not by all” The 
Globe and Mail (August 27, 2004) A5.  
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weaknesses of each candidate” to the Minister. The Committee was al-
so to provide the Minister with the complete record of consultations 
and other material upon which it relied. The Minister could request the 
Committee to undertake further consultations if the Minister felt they 
were incomplete.
40
 In the third stage, the Prime Minister, with the  
advice of the Minister of Justice, would select and appoint a candidate 
from the short list.
41
 In the fourth stage, the Minister of Justice 
would appear before a committee to explain both the process and the 
selection. 
The Liberals had the opportunity to put their plan into action when 
Justice Major announced his retirement in August 2005, effective 
Christmas Day later that year.
42
 Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler 
consulted with the persons previously identified and created a list of 
five to eight candidates which he sent to the Advisory Committee that 
he created.
43
 The Advisory Committee was composed of four MPs (one 
from each of the recognized political parties in the House of 
Commons), one retired judge nominated by the Canadian Judicial 
Council, one member nominated by the provincial Attorneys General in 
the region, one member nominated by the provincial law societies in 
the region and “two eminent people of recognized stature in the region” 
nominated by the Minister of Justice of Canada.
44
 Minister Cotler 
apparently gave the Advisory Committee a mandate letter, “setting out 
                                                                                                             
40 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 144-45. 
41 Id., at 145. According to the protocol established by Minister Cotler, there was a proviso 
for “exceptional circumstances” which would allow the government to select a candidate not on the 
short list. Id. 
42 See Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (August 3, 2005), online: <http://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/2061/index.do>; and Cristin Schmitz, “Race begins after 
resignation opens spot on Supreme Court” The Gazette (August 3 2005) A10. 
43 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process” supra, note 2, at 143. Elsewhere it is 
asserted that Minister Cotler created a long list of eight candidates for the Justice Major vacancy. See 
Ben Alarie & Andrew Green, “Policy Preference Change and Appointments to the Supreme Court of 
Canada” (2009) 47 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1, at para. 7 [hereinafter “Alarie & Green, ‘Policy Preference’”]. 
44 Cotler, id., at 143; Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “New Supreme Court 
of Canada Appointments Process Launched” (August 8, 2005), online: <http://www.collections 
canada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071116083829/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_3
1586.html>. For the members of the Advisory Committee see Canada, Department of Justice, News 
Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of New Advisory Committee for Next Supreme 
Court Appointment” (October 11, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/ 
20071116092711/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31640.html> and Canada, 
Department of Justice, Backgrounder, “Members of the Advisory Committee on Supreme Court of 
Canada Appointments” (October 11, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/ 
20071116092120/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31642.html>. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) REFORMING THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 125 
the objectives of the Committee, describing the merit-based criteria, 
establishing timeframes and providing for a general procedure, 
particularly in relation to confidentiality”.45 Cotler also apparently met 
with the Committee before it began its work.
46
  
The Advisory Committee shortened the list to three names after  
reviewing the résumés and publications of the candidates and consulting 
with third parties (the same persons the Minister had consulted with  
earlier). The committee submitted its list to Minister of Justice Cotler, 
but the Liberal government fell at the end of November 2005 and after an 
election in January 2006, the Conservative Party led by Stephen Harper 
formed the government. The new Harper government chose Justice 
Rothstein from the shortlist but, in a deviation from the Liberal plan, had 
the nominee appear, instead of the Minister of Justice, before an ad hoc 
parliamentary committee.
47
 
Justice Rothstein thus became the first nominee ever to appear for a 
public hearing prior to being appointed to the Supreme Court. He  
appeared not before a parliamentary committee but before an ad hoc 
committee of parliamentarians composed of MPs from the political par-
ties in proportion to their representation in the House.
48
 Professor Peter  
 
 
                                                                                                             
45 Cotler, id., at 143-44. 
46 Id., at 144. 
47 Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Supreme Court nominee to face questions from 
Parliamentarians” (February 20, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=1025>; Prime 
Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister Harper announces nominee for Supreme Court 
appointment” (February 23 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/02/23/prime-minister-
harper-announces-nominee-supreme-court-appointment>. Minister of Justice Toews (as he then was) 
was present at the hearing but he did not take questions from the parliamentarians. He explained the 
process and the basis for the Prime Minister’s selection of Justice Rothstein. I am not enamoured of 
the nomenclature “parliamentary hearing” to describe the questioning of Justice Rothstein and of 
successive nominees. The hearing involves parliamentarians but it is not governed in any way by the 
rules of Parliament, and the term gives the misleading impression that Parliament as an institution 
has some role in the process. The process is accurately described as “ad hoc” and, given the function 
that the hearings have served to date, the participants needed not be parliamentarians. Indeed, for 
reasons described in Part IV, the composition of the ad hoc committees has been problematic 
because of the overlap in membership between the selection/advisory committees and the ad hoc 
committees. The “parliamentary hearings” have been more akin to a television interview than to a 
parliamentary hearing.  
48 Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of 
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ 
media.asp?id=1041>; Donald R Songer, The Transformation of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
An Empirical Examination (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008), at 18 [hereinafter 
“Songer”].  
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Hogg supervised the proceedings, providing introductory comments 
“on the limits of judicial speech”, in order to guide the committee “as 
to the kinds of questions that could or could not be answered by the 
nominee”.49 The members of the committee were free to ask Justice 
Rothstein any questions, but as per Professor Hogg’s admonitions, they 
were aware that Justice Rothstein had the prerogative to decline to an-
swer questions involving issues that could be put before him on the 
Supreme Court.  
The three-hour hearing was televised live and was widely consid-
ered a tame affair, in part due to Justice Rothstein’s amiable personality 
and self-deprecating style.
50
 The committee did not vote on the  
appointment and did not produce a report, although Minister of Justice 
Vic Toews did invite the MPs to share their views with the Prime  
Minister, who reportedly watched the proceedings on television. The 
Prime Minister confirmed Justice Rothstein’s appointment two days 
after the hearing.
51
 
Two years elapsed before the Harper government would have 
another chance to fill a vacancy on the high court. In the interim, it did 
not make any formal policies or issue any plans on how it would 
approach the appointment process. This became apparent after April 9, 
2008, when Justice Michel Bastarache announced that he would be 
stepping down from the Supreme Court, effective June 30, 2008.
52
 
More than six weeks later, the Minister of Justice announced the 
following process to replace Justice Bastarache. First, the Minister of 
Justice and Attorney General would consult with the Attorneys General 
of the four Atlantic provinces as well as leading members of the legal  
 
                                                                                                             
49 Peter W. Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court  
of Canada” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 527, at 528, 531 [hereinafter “Hogg, ‘Appointment of 
Justice Marshall Rothstein’”]. A copy of Hogg’s opening remarks to the Committee is appended 
to his 2006 article. See also House of Commons, Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee  
for the Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (Transcript), (February 27 2006), online: 
<http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/webarchives/20071125225650/http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/ne
ws/sp/2006/doc_31772_1.html>. 
50 For critical comments on the Justice Rothstein hearing, see Mathen, “Choices and 
Controversy”, supra, note 14, and Michael Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis and the Rothstein 
Hearing” (2008) 58 U.NB.L.J. 92 [hereinafter “Plaxton, ‘The Neutrality Thesis’”]. 
51 Prime Minister’s Office, News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of 
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/ 
media.asp?id=1041>; Songer, supra, note 48, at 18.  
52 Supreme Court of Canada, News Release (April 9, 2008), online: <http://scc-csc.lexum.com/ 
scc-csc/news/en/item/2798/index.do>. 
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community. Members of the public were invited to submit their input 
through a Department of Justice website. Based on this process, the 
Minister would prepare a list of an unspecified number of qualified 
candidates which would be reviewed by a selection panel composed of 
five MPs — including two Members from the government caucus and 
one member from each of the recognized Opposition caucuses, as 
selected by their respective leaders. This body — known for the first 
time as “the Supreme Court Selection Panel” — was tasked with the 
responsibility for assessing the candidates and providing an unranked 
short list of three qualified candidates to the Prime Minister of Canada 
and the Minister of Justice for their consideration. Finally, the nominee 
was to appear at a public hearing of an ad hoc parliamentary 
committee, as did Justice Rothstein.
53
 
The Minister of Justice completed his consultations and submitted 
his list of qualified candidates to the Supreme Court Selection Panel. 
That body was beset by partisan bickering and on September 5, 2008, the 
Prime Minister bypassed the panel and announced Justice Cromwell as 
the nominee for appointment. The Prime Minister stated that an appoint-
ment would not be made until Justice Cromwell appeared at a public 
hearing of an ad hoc parliamentary committee.
54
 Two days later, the 
Prime Minister asked the Governor General to dissolve Parliament, trig-
gering an election October 14, 2008. Soon after Parliament reconvened 
in November, Canada was beset by a parliamentary crisis and on  
December 4, 2008, the Governor General prorogued Parliament at the 
Prime Minister’s request.55 Prime Minister Harper dispensed with the 
parliamentary hearing and on December 22, 2008, he formally appointed 
Justice Cromwell to the Supreme Court.
56
 Given fractious and fragile 
parliamentary relations and the wide support for Justice Cromwell, there 
                                                                                                             
53 Department of Justice of Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces 
Selection Process for the Supreme Court of Canada” (May 28, 2008), online: <http://www.   
marketwired.com/press-release/minister-of-justice-announces-selection-process-for-the-supreme-court-of- 
canada-862003.htm>. 
54 Prime Minister of Canada, Press Release, “PM Announces Nominee for Supreme Court 
Appointment” (September 5, 2008), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2008/09/05/pm-announces-
nominee-supreme-court-appointment>. 
55 See generally Peter H. Russell & Lorne M. Sossin, eds., Parliamentary Democracy in 
Crisis (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009). 
56 Government of Canada, News Release, “Prime Minister Harper announces appointment 
of Thomas Cromwell to Supreme Court of Canada” (December 22, 2008). 
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was minimal criticism of the Prime Minister’s dispensing with the process 
for parliamentary consultation and hearing.
57
  
On May 13, 2011, a newly re-elected Conservative government was 
suddenly faced with two vacancies. Justices Ian Binnie and Louise Charron 
jointly announced their retirement on what would otherwise have been a 
sleepy post-election Friday afternoon.
58
 The Prime Minister instituted the 
following process. First, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
would consult with the Attorney General of Ontario as well as leading 
members of the legal community in order to identify a pool of qualified 
candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court. Members of the public 
were invited to submit their input regarding candidates through a 
Department of Justice website. Based on this process, the Minister of 
Justice would create a list of unspecified numbers of qualified candidates. 
Second, this “long list” of qualified candidates would be reviewed by a 
selection panel composed of five MPs: three government MPs and one 
from each of the opposition parties, the NDP and the Liberals, as selected 
by the leaders of those parties. The Supreme Court Selection Panel was 
tasked with assessing the candidates and providing an unranked short list 
of six qualified candidates to the Prime Minister and the Minister of 
Justice for their consideration. Third, while it was unstated, it was 
implied that the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice would only make 
a selection of a “nominee” from this shortlist. Fourth, the selected 
“nominees” would appear at a public hearing of ad hoc parliamentary 
committee to answer questions from MPs as Justice Rothstein had done 
in 2006.
59
 
This process was followed in 2011 for the appointments of Justices 
Moldaver and Karakatsanis,
60
 in 2012 for the appointment of Justice 
                                                                                                             
57 See, e.g., Janice Tibbetts, “Justice can no longer be delayed” Edmonton Journal 
(December 23, 2008) A7; Kirk Makin, “Top-court appointment process bypasses review process” 
The Globe and Mail (December 23, 2008) A4; Editorial, “Hurry, without hearing” The Globe and 
Mail (December 23, 2008) A14; Editorial, “Harper abandons zeal for reform” The Toronto Star 
(December 26, 2008) A57; David Asper, “Picking the lesser evil” National Post (December 27, 
2008) A25. 
58 See Supreme Court of Canada, “News Release” (May 13, 2011), online: <http://scc-
csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/news/en/item/3701/index.do>; Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the 
Prime Minister of Canada on the Upcoming Retirement of Two Supreme Court Judges” (May 13, 
2011), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2011/05/13/statement-prime-minister-canada-upcoming-
retirement-two-supreme-court-judges> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada, ‘Upcoming 
Retirement’”]. The announcement was surprising because Justice Binnie did not have to retire until 
2014 and Justice Charron until 2026. 
59 Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, id. 
60 Id. 
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Wagner
61
 and in 2013 for the appointment of Justice Nadon.
62
 The Office 
of Federal Judicial Affairs — the body that oversees and administers fed-
eral judicial appointments — administers the appointment process, at 
least respecting the Selection Panel.
63
 It is not clear what role the Office 
of Federal Judicial Affairs plays in compiling the long list. In each of 
those appointments, the hearing took place two days after the Prime Min-
ister’s announcement of the nominee. In 2011, Professor Peter Hogg 
reprised the role of counsel to the parliamentary committee that he had 
performed in 2006 at the Rothstein hearing. In both 2012 and 2013, for-
mer Quebec Court of Appeal Justice Jean-Louis Baudouin exercised this 
function. The day after each of these hearings, the Prime Minister for-
mally appointed his nominee to the Supreme Court.
64
 
Thus, as seen in Table 1, between 2004 and 2013, various appoint-
ment processes were used. However, since 2011, the Government seems 
to have settled on a process involving a “Supreme Court Selection Panel” 
consisting of five MPs and an ad hoc committee of MPs which questions 
the “nominee” at a public hearing.  
                                                                                                             
61 Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Retirement of 
Justice Marie Deschamps” (May 18, 2012), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2012/05/18/ statement-
prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-marie-deschamps> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada, 
‘Justice Marie Deschamps’”]. 
62 Prime Minister of Canada, “Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada on the Retirement 
of Justice Morris Fish” (April 23, 2013), online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/04/23/ 
statement-prime-minister-canada-retirement-justice-morris-fish> [hereinafter “Prime Minister of Canada, 
‘Justice Morris Fish’”]. 
63 According to the Federal Judicial Affairs website, “The Minister of Justice has given FJA 
the mandate to administer the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Selection Panel process, 
established to evaluate candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court of Canada.” Office of the 
Commissioner of Federal Judicial Affairs, “Our Role”, online: <http://www.fja-cmf.gc.ca/fja-cmf/ 
role-eng.html>. 
64 Strictly speaking, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council. See 
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2). The Governor in Council is the Governor General 
acting on the advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, i.e., the federal cabinet. See 
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 13 (reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5). 
See generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. Supp. (Toronto: Carswell, 
2007), at § 9.4(b) [hereinafter “Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada”]. The Prime Minister advises 
the Governor General on behalf of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada. It has become clear that 
the choice of all Supreme Court judges is the personal prerogative of the Prime Minister. See 
A. Anne McLellan, “Foreword” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 603, at 604 [hereinafter “McLellan, 
‘Foreword’”]; Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2; and Tonda 
MacCharles, “Supreme Court pick defends qualifications: Justice Marc Nadon concedes he doesn’t 
meet any diversity expectations for upper chamber” The Toronto Star (October 3, 2013) A28 (stating 
that Justice Minister Peter MacKay noted that the selection of Supreme Court justices was the 
decision of the Prime Minister) [hereinafter “MacCharles, ‘Supreme Court pick defends 
qualifications’”]. 
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Table 1: Modes of Appointment of Supreme Court Judges  
2004–2013 
Judge (Year) Advisory Committee Public Hearing Others 
Abella and 
Charron (2004) 
No Yes. Minister of Justice 
appeared before ad hoc 
committee. 
 
Rothstein (2006) Yes. 4 MPs, 1  
provincial rep, 1 
retired judge, 1 Law 
Society rep, 2 public 
Yes. Nominee  
appeared before  
ad hoc committee  
of parliamentarians  
and judicial and law 
society representatives. 
 
Cromwell (2008) No No Prime  
Minister had 
intended to 
proceed with 
both advisory 
committee and 
public hearing 
Karakatsanis 
and Moldaver 
(2011) 
Yes. 5 MPs  
(3 Conservative,  
1 NDP, 1 Liberal) 
Yes. Nominees  
appeared before  
ad hoc committee  
of MPs. 
 
Wagner (2012) Yes. 5 MPs  
(3 Conservative, 
1 NDP, 1 Liberal) 
Yes. Nominee appeared 
before ad hoc  
committee of MPs. 
 
Nadon (2013) Yes. 5 MPs  
(3 Conservative,  
1 NDP, 1 Liberal) 
Yes. Nominee appeared 
before ad hoc  
committee of MPs. 
 
III. DEMOCRATIC AUDIT AND DRIVERS OF CHANGE  
1. The Concept of a Democratic Audit 
The concept of a democratic audit of Canadian political institutions 
was conceived by a group of political scientists in the first decade of the 
21st century in response to two apparently contradictory phenomena: the 
increasing identification of a “democratic deficit” among political lead-
ers, government commissions, academics, citizen groups and the media, 
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and the continued veneration of Canadian democracy around the world.
65
 
Led by Professor William Cross, Bell Chair for the Study of Canadian 
Parliamentary Democracy at Carleton University, the Canadian Democratic 
Audit series audited Canadian federalism,
66
 legislatures,
67
 cabinets and 
first ministers,
68
 citizens,
69
 elections,
70
 political parties,
71
 advocacy 
groups,
72
 communications technology,
73
 and the courts.
74
 
The participants in the Canadian Democratic Audit selected partici-
pation, inclusiveness and responsiveness as the audit benchmarks to 
evaluate the particular feature of Canadian democracy.
75
 They chose 
these benchmarks based on normative considerations of the meaning of 
democracy that they believed were relevant to Canada in the 21st century. 
In defending their choice of the above three benchmarks, they explained: 
“We believe that any contemporary definition of Canadian democracy 
must include institutions and decision-making practices that are defined 
by public participation, that this participation must include all Canadians, 
and that government outcomes must respond to the views of Canadians.”76 
While these benchmarks are instructive, I do not adopt them for pur-
poses of my “audit” of changes to the Supreme Court appointment 
process over the past decade. Rather, I am inspired by the idea and the 
methodology of the democratic audit. Instead, I have selected the follow-
ing three benchmarks: (1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) the 
promotion of public knowledge about the work of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and its judges.  
                                                                                                             
65 See William Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2006) vii, at vii [hereinafter “Greene, The Courts”]. This Foreword is contained in each of the nine 
substantive volumes of The Canadian Democratic Audit Series identified in notes 66-74, infra. See 
generally William Cross, “Constructing the Canadian Democratic Audit” in William Cross, ed., 
Auditing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 1 at 1-11. 
66 Jennifer Smith, Federalism (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
67 David Docherty, Legislatures (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
68 Graham White, Cabinets and First Ministers (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
69 Elizabeth Gidengil et al., Citizens (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
70 John Courtney, Elections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
71 William Cross, Political Parties (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
72 Lisa Young & Joanna Everitt, Advocacy Groups (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004). 
73 Darin Barney, Communication Technology (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). 
74 See Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). 
75 William Cross, “Constructing the Canadian Democratic Audit” in William Cross, ed., 
Auditing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010) 1, at 1. 
76 William Cross, “Foreword” in Ian Greene, The Courts, supra, note 65, at vii. This 
Foreword is contained in each of the nine substantive volumes of The Canadian Democratic Audit 
Series identified in notes 66-74, supra.  
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I have selected transparency and accountability because these values 
were and continue to be the dominant factors, concerns about which pre-
cipitated changes to the appointment process and that continue to be used 
to justify those changes, as expressed in the statement by Prime Minister 
Harper in the quote at the beginning of this paper.
77
 For example, in an-
nouncing the members of the Selection Panel to advise on the appointment 
to fill the vacancy created by Justice Fish’s retirement in 2013, the Justice 
Canada News Release stated: “The Selection Panel plays a critical role in 
ensuring transparency and balance in the Supreme Court appointment pro-
cess.”78 The exact same language was used in 2012 upon the retirement of 
Justice Deschamps,
79
 and in 2011 upon the retirement of Justices Binnie 
and Charron.
80
 I am not alone in asserting that the reforms were intended 
to increase transparency and accountability.
81
 
As discussed in Part III.4, promoting public knowledge about the 
work of the Supreme Court of Canada and its judges was not a causal 
factor in precipitating the changes ushered in by the Martin government 
and continued by the Harper government. However, since 2004, it has 
been invoked as an explanatory factor for the changes. Thus, when Peter 
Hogg opened the proceedings for MPs to interview Justice Rothstein in 
February 2006, he stated that the purpose of the new process was “to 
make appointments to the Court more open, and to promote public 
                                                                                                             
77 News Release, “Prime Minister announces appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein 
to the Supreme Court” (March 1, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/03/01/prime-minister-
announces-appointment-mr-justice-marshall-rothstein-supreme-court> [hereinafter “Appointment of 
Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein”]: “The way in which Justice Rothstein was appointed marks an 
historic change in how we appoint judges in this country. It brought unprecedented openness and 
accountability to the process. The hearings allowed Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein 
through their members of Parliament in a way that was not previously possible.” 
78 Justice Canada, News Release: “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (June 11 2013), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-
nouv/nr-cp/2013/doc_32908.html>. 
79 Justice Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (August 8, 2012), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ 
nr-cp/2012/doc_32776.html>. 
80Justice Canada, News Release, “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme 
Court of Canada Selection Panel” (August 5, 2011), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-
nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_32624.html>. 
81 See Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis”, supra, note 50, at 97 (asserting that the new 
appointments process was supposed to generate greater transparency and accountability); Lorne 
Sossin, “Judicial Appointment, Democratic Aspirations, and the Culture of Accountability” (2008) 
58 U.N.B.L.J. 11, at 33 (stating that the hearing process created by Prime Minister Harper in 2006 
ensures that there is a forum for political accountability to play a role in the appointments process) 
[hereinafter “Sossin, ‘Judicial Appointment’”]. 
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knowledge of the judges of the Court”.82 And when after those hearings, 
the Prime Minister formally announced the appointment of Justice Rothstein 
to the Court, the Prime Minister stated that “[t]he hearings allowed  
Canadians to get to know Justice Rothstein through their members of 
Parliament in a way that was not previously possible”.83 Similar state-
ments were repeated in the appointments of 2011, 2012 and 2013.
84
  
Other benchmarks could have been chosen for this audit, such as  
representativeness,
85
 bilingualism,
86
 provincial participation,
87
 parliamen-
tary oversight,
88
 “merit”,89 or enhancing the legitimacy of the Supreme 
                                                                                                             
82 Peter W. Hogg, “Notes for opening remarks to Ad Hoc Committee to Review a Nominee 
for the Supreme Court of Canada”, February 27, 2006, reproduced in Appendix to Peter W. Hogg, 
“Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49, at 537-38. 
83 “Appointment of Mr. Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 77. 
84 See Moldaver & Karakatsanis Transcript (2011) [hereinafter “Moldaver & Karakatsanis 
Transcript”]; Wagner Transcript (2012) [hereinafter “Wagner Transcript”]; and Nadon Transcript 
(2013) [hereinafter “Nadon Transcript”]. 
85 Cf. Lorne Sossin, “Should Canada Have a Representative Supreme Court?” [hereinafter 
“Sossin, ‘Representative Supreme Court”] in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 27; Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, 
supra, note 81; Indigenous Bar Association, “Respecting Legal Pluralism in Canada: Indigenous Bar 
Association Appeals to Harper Government to Appoint an Aboriginal Justice to the Supreme Court of 
Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 65; Indigenous Bar Association, “Indigenous Bar Association Urges 
Prime Minister Harper to Remove Barriers to Judicial Appointments for Indigenous Judges” in Verelli, id., 
67; Sonia Lawrence, “Reflections on Judicial Diversity and Judicial Independence” in Adam Dodek & 
Lorne Sossin, eds., Judicial Independence in Context (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2010); K.D. Ewing, “A Theory 
of Democratic Adjudication: Towards a Representative, Accountable and Independent Judiciary” (2000) 
38 Alta. L. Rev. 708; Richard Devlin, A. Wayne Mackay & Natasha Kim, “Reducing the Democratic 
Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a ‘Triple P’ Judiciary” (2000) 38 
Alta. L. Rev 734 [hereinafter “Devlin, Mackay & Kim”]; Ian Peach, “Legitimacy on Trial: A Process for 
Appointing Justices to the Supreme Court of Canada”, Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy, Public 
Policy Paper 30 (February 2005) 9 [hereinafter “Peach”]; Isabel Grant & Lynn Smith, “Gender 
Representation in the Canadian Judiciary” in Ontario Law Reform Commission, Appointing Judges: 
Philosophy, Politics and Practice (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991) 57. 
86 Cf. Sébastien Grammond & Mark Power, “Should Supreme Court Judges be Required to 
be Bilingual?” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 49; Sossin, “Representative Supreme Court”, id., at 43-44; 
Parliament of Canada, Bilingualism of Supreme Court Judges (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 2011); 
Philip Slayton, Mighty Judgment: How the Supreme Court of Canada Runs Your Life (Toronto: 
Allen Lane, 2011), at 250-52 [hereinafter “Slayton”]. 
87 Cf. Erin Crandall, “Intergovernmental Relations and the Supreme Court of Canada: The 
Changing Place of the Provinces in Judicial Selection Reform” [hereinafter “Crandall”] in Verrelli, supra, 
note 20, 71; F.C. DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence of ‘Canada’s Fundamental Values’ and Appointment to the 
Supreme Court of Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 87 [hereinafter “DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence””]; 
and Eugénie Brouillet & Yves Tanguay, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Arbitration in a Multinational 
Federative System: The Case of the Supreme Court of Canada” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 126. 
88 See Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments: When 
and How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253. 
89 Cf. Janice Tibbetts, “Judge wants merit to be criteria for supreme job” The Edmonton 
Journal (March 4, 1999) A10; R. Foot, “Retired high court judge opposes calls for reform” National 
Post (October 28, 1999); Peach, supra, note 85; Hutchinson, supra, note 20. 
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Court.
90
 Others have argued strenuously that the entire appointment pro-
cess should be overhauled to make it more independent of government 
and provide checks and balances in the appointment process.
91
 However, 
these are all normative claims regarding what the appointment process 
should be about. My goal in this paper is to assess the reforms based on 
what those who control and shape the process have claimed they are 
about. As set out below, the clear intention of the reforms was to enhance 
transparency and accountability in the appointment process and, second-
arily, to increase understanding of Supreme Court justices and their 
work. 
2. Federalism and the Era of Mega-Constitutional Politics,  
1875–1992 
When Parliament created the Supreme Court in 1875, it vested the 
power of appointment of Supreme Court justices with the federal Cabi-
net.
92
 This decision was consistent with the prevailing political values of 
the time and the desire of the Fathers of Confederation to centralize pow-
er in a strong central government.  
The Supreme Court was a controversial institution from the moment 
of its creation. It was the subject of much criticism which even involved 
appeals for its abolition.
93
 The quality of appointments frequently came 
under attack, especially for patronage.
94
 With abolition of appeals to the 
                                                                                                             
90 Cf. Peach, id. 
91 Peter Russell and Jacob Ziegel have been the most notable proponents of this view. See e.g., 
Peter H. Russell, “Conclusion” in Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., Appointing Judges in an Age 
of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from Around the World (Toronto: University of Toronto Press) 
420; Jacob S. Ziegel, “A New Era in the Selection of Supreme Court Judges?” (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
547; Jacob S. Ziegel, “Appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada” (1994) 5 Const. Forum 10; and 
Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28. See also F.L. Morton, “Judicial Appointments in Post-Charter 
Canada: A System in Transition” in Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell, eds., id., 56. 
92 Strictly speaking, Supreme Court judges are appointed by the Governor in Council. See 
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 4(2). The Governor in Council is the Governor General 
acting on the advice of the Queen’s Privy Council for Canada, i.e., the federal Cabinet. See 
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 13. See generally Peter W. Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, 
note 64, at § 9.4(b). The Prime Minister advises the Governor General on behalf of the Queen’s 
Privy Council for Canada. It has become clear that the choice of all Supreme Court judges is the 
personal prerogative of the Prime Minister. See supra, note 64. 
93 See James G. Snell & Frederick Vaughn, The Supreme Court of Canada: History of the 
Institution (Toronto: Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 1985) 28 [hereinafter “Snell & 
Vaughn”]. 
94 Snell & Vaughn, id., at 82-85, 119; Ian Bushnell, The Captive Court (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992) at 115. 
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Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 1949, the Supreme Court  
became truly supreme and calls to reform the appointment process by 
giving the provinces or the Senate some role began.
95
 However, formal 
proposals to reform the appointments process began in earnest during the 
era of Canadian mega-constitutional politics which coincides with the 
ascension of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister in 1968. 
In 1968, Prime Minister Pearson published a policy statement enti-
tled Federalism for the Future.
96
 It identified the Supreme Court as one 
of the central institutions of Canadian federalism and stated a willing-
ness to discuss questions relating to the “composition, jurisdiction and 
procedures” of the Supreme Court at future constitutional meetings as 
part of any review of the Canadian Constitution.
97
 Later that year, Pierre 
Trudeau became Prime Minister and issued his own policy statement, 
which became a blueprint for his inaugural first ministers’ conference in 
1969.
98
 Trudeau’s policy statement squarely identified “the manner of 
selection of the members of the Court” as an item for reform and consti-
tutional entrenchment. According to Trudeau, “[j]udges should not be 
regarded as representatives of several different governments which 
could conceivably be allowed to appoint them.” Thus, Trudeau proposed 
that there be “some form of participation” by the provinces in the  
appointment process. Moreover, Trudeau suggested that nominations  
for potential appointees could be submitted to a reformed Senate for 
approval.
99
 
The entrenchment of the Supreme Court in the Constitution and pro-
vincial participation in the selection of its judges thus became part of 
constitutional discussions and proposals from 1969 until 1992: provi-
sions were included in the Victoria Charter (1971),
100
 Bill C-60 
                                                                                                             
95 Snell & Vaughn, id., at 194, 204; Peter H. Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a 
Bilingual and Bicultural Institution (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1969), at 44-45. 
96 The Rt. Honourable Lester B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada, Federalism for the 
Future: A Statement of Policy by the Government of Canada (1968), reproduced in Anne F. 
Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitutional Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary History, vol. 1 
(Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1989) 61 [hereinafter “Bayefsky”]. 
97 Id., at 68. 
98 See The Right Honourable Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, The 
Constitution and the People of Canada: An Approach to the Objectives of Confederation, the Rights 
of People and the Institutions of Government (1968), reproduced in Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 78. 
99 Id., at 88-89. 
100 Canadian Constitutional Charter, 1971 (The Victoria Charter) articles 22-42, reproduced 
in Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 215-17. 
136 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
(1978),
101
 the report of the Pepin-Robarts Commission (1979),
102
 as well 
as on the agenda during most of the constitutional conferences in the 
1970s.
103
 However, during the intense constitutional negotiations of 
1980-1981, the Supreme Court fell off the constitutional agenda,
104
  
except respecting the amending formula. Thus, when the Constitution 
was patriated and the Constitution Act, 1982 enacted, the only mention of 
the Supreme Court was contained in Part V of that Act under the amend-
ing formula.
105
 
Entrenching the Supreme Court and reforming the appointment process 
re-emerged on the constitutional agenda in the Meech Lake Accord 
(1987)
106
 and in the Charlottetown Accord (1992).
107
 In both cases, the pro-
posals would have empowered the relevant provinces to submit names of 
nominees to the Prime Minister. The proposed reforms during this era were 
confined to giving the provinces a larger and formal role in the appointment 
process. Federalism concerns soon fell off the reform agenda for the Su-
preme Court as new concerns began to dominate the political discourse.
108
 
3. The Democratic Deficit and Democratic Reform, 1993–2004 
With the defeat of the Charlottetown Accord in the October 1992 ref-
erendum, the era of mega-constitutional politics ended. In the 1993 
election that brought Jean Chrétien and the Liberals to power, the Reform 
Party took Ottawa by storm. Although it fell two seats short of forming 
                                                                                                             
101 Bill C-60, The Constitutional Amendment Bill, 30th Parl., 3rd Sess. (June 20, 1978), 
ss. 100-115, reproduced in Bayefsky, id., at 387-93. 
102 Task Force on Canadian Unity, A Future Together: Observations and Recommendations 
(Hull, QC: Minister of Supply and Services, 1979). 
103 See Bayefsky, supra, note 96, at 309-40, 437-529, 537-85. 
104 Tom Kent blames Trudeau for not wanting to cede any control over the appointment 
process. See Tom Kent, “Supreme Court Appointments: By Parliament, Not PM, and Shorter” in 
Verrelli, supra, note 20, 93, at 96 [hereinafter “Kent”]: “Trudeau’s determined dedication to the 
Charter was joined with scant regard for most of politics and its practitioners. Willing as he was to 
upset many applecarts, the existing concentration of authority in the prime minister was to him the 
natural order of things. Amid the constitution-making turmoil of 1981 there were no voices strong 
enough to say him nay.” 
105 See Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, 
c. 11, ss. 41(d), 42(d) (as discussed in Supreme Court Reference, supra, note 3). 
106 Peter W. Hogg, Meech Lake Constitutional Accord Annotated (Toronto: Carswell, 1988). 
107 Consensus Report on the Constitution in Kenneth McRoberts & Patrick Monahan, eds., 
The Charlottetown Accord, the Referendum and the Future of Canada (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1993). 
108 Some scholars have continued to raise them. See F.C. DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence”, 
supra, note 87; others supra, note 86. 
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the Official Opposition party, the Reform Party with its 52 seats made a 
huge impact on national politics over the course of the next decade in 
many areas of public policy. In the area of fiscal policy, it helped galva-
nize support against budget deficits. In the area that might be considered 
“democratic policy”, Preston Manning’s Reform Party promoted populist 
initiatives like Senate Reform, free votes in the House of Commons,  
judicial elections and referendums, all aimed at the devolution of power 
from the Prime Minister. The Reform Party hammered away at the  
democratic reform agenda and succeeded in placing it on the national 
political agenda.  
The Reform Party squarely raised Supreme Court selection as part of 
its democratic reform political agenda.
109
 Throughout the 1990s, Reform 
Party platforms consistently took aim at judicial appointments. Reform 
platform “Blue Books” called generally for “more stringent and more 
public ratification procedures for Supreme Court justices in light of the 
powers our legislators are handing to the courts”.110 In 1991, Reform 
added a call for the (reformed) Senate to ratify Supreme Court appoint-
ments.
111
 In 1996-1997, Reform called for a more “democratic and 
accountable” system for all judicial appointments.112 Reform advocated a 
role for the provinces in the appointment process
113
 and term limits for 
Supreme Court justices.
114
  
                                                                                                             
109 On the critical role of the Reform party in this respect, see Crandall, supra, note 87, 
at 77-78. For criticisms of the Prime Minister’s power of appointment over Supreme Court justices 
during this period see Jacob S. Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28; Peter McCormick, “Could 
We, Should We, Reform the Senate and the Supreme Court?” (January-February 2000) Policy 
Options 7; Ted Morton, “Reforming the Canadian Judiciary”, Remarks prepared for the Calgary 
Congress, Citizens Centre for Freedom of Democracy, September 30, 2006 (on file with the author). 
110 Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies 1990 (Calgary: Reform, 1990), at 7, 
online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2230 
&REC=19>. This language is repeated verbatim in: Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies 
The Blue Book 1995 (Calgary: Reform, 1995), at 38, online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/ 
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2156&REC=2> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1995”]. 
111 Reform Party of Canada, Principles & Policies 1991 (Calgary: Reform, 1991), at 7, 
online: <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2212 
&REC=20>. See also Blue Book 1995, id., at 38.  
112 Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book 1996-1997 Principles & Policies of the Reform  
Party of Canada (Calgary: Reform, 1996), at 28 <http://digitalcollections.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/ 
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2128&REC=7> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1996-1997”]. 
113 Id. This is also stated in Reform Party of Canada, Blue Book Principles & Policies of the 
Reform Party of Canada 1999 (Calgary: Reform, 1999), at 13 <http://contentdm.ucalgary.ca/cdm4/ 
document.php?CISOROOT=/reform&CISOPTR=2258&REC=18> [hereinafter “Blue Book 1999”]. 
114 Blue Book 1996-1997, id., at 28; Blue Book 1999, id., at 13. The Canadian Constitutional 
Foundation (“CCF”) continues to advocate for term limits for Supreme Court justices. See online: 
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Democratic reform became a leading political issue in the first years 
of the 21st century.
115
 The democratic reform movement was supported 
by academic and popular writings and translated into a vast array of po-
litical party initiatives, some of which became government policy. In The 
Friendly Dictatorship,
116
 Globe and Mail columnist Jeffrey Simpson 
captured the spirit of the Chrétien age in what has become the defining 
political analysis of that period. University of Moncton Professor Donald 
Savoie wrote academic volumes that catalogued and critiqued the cen-
tralization of power.
117
  
The opening years of the 21st century saw the makings of a democratic 
reform movement. In 2001, Gordon Campbell’s Liberal Party swept to 
power in British Columbia
118
 promising various democratic reforms.
119
 
In New Brunswick, the government created a Commission on Legislative 
Democracy in December 2003 to examine and make recommendations 
regarding electoral, legislative and democratic reform.
120
 In Prince  
Edward Island, a 2003 report recommending electoral reform was  
followed by another commission detailing the proposed reform and a 
                                                                                                             
<http://termlimits.ca/>. For reasons that I hope to describe elsewhere at another time, this is a 
solution in search of a problem. 
115 I first chronicled the democratic reform movement in Adam M. Dodek, “The Past, 
Present and Future of Fixed Election Dates in Canada” (2010) 4 J. of Parliamentary and Political L. 
215. The following paragraphs largely reproduce material contained in pages 218-223 of that article. 
116 Jeffrey Simpson, The Friendly Dictatorship (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2002). 
117 See Donald J. Savoie, Court Government and the Collapse of Accountability in Canada 
and the United Kingdom (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008) [hereinafter “Savoie”] and 
Governing from the Centre: The Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1999). For a more recent compelling account of the democratic deficit and the 
need for reform, see Peter Aucoin, Mark D. Jarvis & Lori Turnbull, Democratizing the Constitution: 
Reforming Responsible Government (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2011). 
118 There were two important drivers for Campbell’s democratic reform agenda. First, the 
B.C. Liberals had never held power in modern B.C. politics. Second, in the May 1996 election, the 
B.C. Liberal Party had lost the provincial election by six seats despite winning the popular vote. 
Attorney General and Minister Responsible for Constitutional Reform Geoff Plant explained the 
May 1996 election as a “turning point” for democracy in British Columbia. See Geoff Plant, “The 
Government’s View” in Gordon Gibson, ed., Fixing Canadian Democracy (Vancouver: The Fraser 
Institute, 2003) 169, at 170. 
119 These included fixed election dates, fixed dates for tabling of the budget, a set legislative 
calendar, holding open cabinet meetings to be televised and broadcast over the Internet, overhauling 
campaign financing laws, introducing free votes in the legislature and establishing a Citizen’s Assembly 
on electoral reform to be followed by a province-wide referendum on proposed changes to the electoral 
system. See B.C. Liberal Party, A New Era for British Columbia (2001) 30 (on file with author). 
120 See Commission on Legislative Democracy (N.B.), Final Report and Recommendations 
(Fredericton: Commission on Legislative Democracy, 2004), at 4 (“How We Did Our Work”) and 181-82 
(“Background Appendix: Mission, Mandate, and Terms of Reference”). 
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failed plebiscite in November 2005 rejecting reform.
121
 In Quebec, the 
Estates General on the Reform of Democratic Institutions (the Beland 
Commission) presented a report to the Minister Responsible for Reform 
of Democratic Institutions in March 2003.
122
 
In Ontario, Dalton McGuinty’s opposition Liberals made democratic 
reform one of five key pillars of their 2003 platform,
123
 and after winning 
the election that year created a Democratic Reform Secretariat and 
named a Minister Responsible for Democratic Renewal.
124
 Ontario’s 
Liberals implemented various democratic reform initiatives, most nota-
bly fixed election dates and a Citizen’s Assembly on Electoral Reform 
culminating in a province-wide referendum on voting day in October 
2007 under the province’s first fixed election date. 
By 2003, several leading political scientists commented on the  
centrality of the democratic deficit in Canadian public policy discourse: 
“Few would have foreseen five years ago that the very infrastructure of 
democracy would today be the most active area of public policy delibera-
tion and innovation in this country.”125 This was the political context 
surrounding Paul Martin’s embrace of the democratic reform agenda 
when he began publicly challenging Jean Chrétien for the Liberal Party 
leadership.
126
 Mr. Martin’s advocacy for changing the Supreme Court  
appointment process must be viewed through this prism.  
                                                                                                             
121 See Andre Barnes & James R. Robertson, Electoral Reform Initiatives in Canadian 
Provinces (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, August 18, 2009), at 7-10. 
122 Id. 
123 Ontario Liberal Party, Government That Works for You: The Ontario Liberal Plan for a 
More Democratic Ontario (Toronto: Ontario Liberal Party, 2003). 
124 The author served as Senior Policy Adviser to the Hon. Michael Bryant, Attorney 
General of Ontario and Minister Responsible for Aboriginal Affairs during the time that he was also 
the Minister Responsible for Democratic Reform (October 2003 to June 2005). In June 2005, the 
Hon. Marie Boutrogianni became the Minister Responsible for Democratic Reform and the Minister 
of Intergovernmental Relations for the duration of the Ontario Liberals’ first mandate until the 
first fixed-date election was held in October 2007. After that election, no Minister Responsible 
for Democratic Reform was appointed and the Democratic Renewal Secretariat (“DRS”) was 
organizationally abandoned. See Government of Ontario, “Browse by Organization”, online: 
<http://www.infogo.gov.on.ca/infogo/searchDirectory.do?actionType=searchtelephone&infoType= 
telephone&locale=en>. 
125 Paul Howe, Richard Johnston & André Blais, “Introduction: The New Landscape of 
Canadian Democracy” in Paul Howe, Richard Johnston & André Blais, eds., Strengthening 
Canadian Democracy (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2005) 3, at 6. 
126 On the centrality of democratic reform for Paul Martin’s policy agenda, see Susan 
Delacourt, Juggernaut: Paul Martin’s Campaign for Chrétien’s Crown (Toronto: McClelland & 
Stewart, 2003), at 258-59. 
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Martin put forward a package of reforms to strengthen the role of Par-
liament and reduce the power of the Prime Minister’s Office (“PMO”).127 
These included more free votes for MPs, increased independence for  
parliamentary committees, creating an independent ethics commissioner 
and improving the system for private members’ bills. Martin proposed that 
Supreme Court nominations be subject to review by a parliamentary com-
mittee.
128
 The key event was a speech Martin gave at Osgoode Hall Law 
School on October 21, 2002, in which he laid out a six-point plan for  
democratic reform in order to reduce the “democratic deficit”.129 The entire 
thrust of Martin’s plan was to reduce or “check” the power of the executive 
and strengthen Parliament. Martin promised to change the culture of  
Ottawa away from “Who do you know in the PMO?”130 
On the day that Paul Martin became Prime Minister in December 2003, 
he announced that his government would “change the way things work in 
Ottawa in order to re-engage Canadians in the political process” and that his 
government would “introduce a number of reforms to the way House of 
Commons affairs are conducted in order to provide Canadians with more 
responsive government”.131 The purpose of such reforms was to “restore 
Canadians’ trust that their government is listening to them. This is best done 
by confirming Parliament as the centre of national debate and renewing the 
capacity of Parliamentarians — from all parties — to shape policy.”132 In a 
separate press release on democratic reform, the Prime Minister announced 
                                                                                                             
127 John Gray, Paul Martin: The Power of Ambition (Toronto: Key Porter Books, 2003), at 
228; Susan Delacourt, Juggernaut: Paul Martin’s Campaign for Chrétien’s Crown (Toronto: 
McClelland & Stewart, 2003), at 258-59, 297; and Brooke Jeffrey, Divided Loyalties: The Liberal 
Party of Canada, 1984-2008 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), at 410-12.  
128 Paul Martin, Speech at Osgoode Hall Law School (October 21, 2002) [hereinafter “Paul 
Martin, Speech”]. See Campbell Clark, “Martin’s plan gives back bench more clout; His proposal to 
transform Parliament would bolster MPs and cut PMO’s power” The Globe and Mail (October 22, 
2002), A1 [hereinafter “Clark”].  
129 While Martin used the term “democratic deficit” in 2002 to describe the weakened role of 
Parliament and parliamentarians in Canadian politics, two years earlier three scholars at Dalhousie 
Law School (now Schulich School of Law at Dalhousie University) described the judicial 
appointment process as a “democratic deficit”. See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85. The 
authors also credit Dr. Alexandra Dobrowolsky of St. Mary’s University for suggesting the title to 
them. For Mr. Martin’s reflections on his changes to the process, see Paul Martin, Hell or High 
Water: My Life In and Out of Politics (Toronto: Douglas Gibson, 2008), at 406-407. 
130 Paul Martin, Speech, supra, note 128. See Clark, supra, note 128. 
131 Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “A New Approach: Prime Minister Martin 
Announces New Government will be guided by a new approach” (December 12, 2003), online: 
<http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc.ca/eng/ 
news.asp@id=3>.  
132 Id. 
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that his government would “specifically consult the Standing Committee on 
Justice and Human Rights on how best to implement prior review of ap-
pointments of Supreme Court of Canada judges”.133 Minister of Justice 
Irwin Cotler has written that the Prime Minister spoke to him that same day, 
emphasizing the importance of reforming the Supreme Court appointments 
process and of Parliament’s role in that reform.134  
In February 2004, the Martin Government issued a “Democratic  
Action Plan” that was entitled Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An 
Action Plan for Democratic Reform.
135
 It built on Martin’s December 
2003 announcements and made them official government policy. The 
Democratic Action Plan called for prior parliamentary committee review 
of all high-level appointments made by the federal government. On  
Supreme Court appointments, the Democratic Action Plan was less than 
concrete. It committed the government to consult the relevant parliamen-
tary committee(s) on how best to implement review of Supreme Court 
appointments. Importantly, Martin’s Democratic Action Plan identified 
three pillars: (1) “Ethics and integrity”; (2) “Restoration of the repre-
sentative and deliberative role of MPs”; and (3) “Accountability”.136 
As discussed in Part II, in March 2004 the Justice Committee began 
considering reforms to the Supreme Court appointments process. Con-
siderations were interrupted by the federal election, which was held on 
June 28, 2004 and returned a Liberal minority government. The Liberal 
Party had included its commitment to give Parliament a role in reviewing 
Supreme Court appointments in its spring election platform.
137
 Again, 
this was made in the context of “tackling the democratic deficit”.138 In 
                                                                                                             
133 Prime Minister’s Office, Press Release, “Democratic Reform” (December 12, 2003), 
online: <http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/205/301/prime_minister-ef/paul_martin/06-02-03/www.pm.gc. 
ca/eng/news.asp@id=1>. 
134 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process” supra, note 2, at 134. 
135 Privy Council Office, Ethics, Responsibility, Accountability: An Action Plan for 
Democratic Reform (Ottawa: Privy Council Office, February 4 2004), online: <http://www.pco-
bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/publications/aarchives/dr-rd/docs/dr-rd-eng.pdf>. Paul Martin’s Osgoode 
speech references Parliament committee review of all government appointments generally, but does 
not mention the Supreme Court specifically. Paul Martin, “Democratic Deficit” (2002/2003) 24:1 
Policy Options 10 [text of speech].  
136 Privy Council Office, id. 
137 See Liberal Party of Canada, Moving Canada Forward: The Paul Martin Plan for 
Getting Things Done (Ottawa: Liberal Party of Canada, 2004), at 7. 
138 Id.  
Paul Martin took office with a detailed plan to make government work better for Canadians 
— to make it more democratic, more ethical, more accountable. The new government has:  
• Restored Parliament to the centre of national debate and decision-making by  
implementing broad democratic reforms to give your MP a greater voice.  
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August 2004, Prime Minister Martin selected Justices Abella and  
Charron to fill the vacancies created by the departures of Justices Arbour 
and Iacobucci. Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before an ad hoc 
committee of parliamentarians instead of the Justice Committee because 
the new post-election Parliament had not yet been summoned.  
In November 2005, the Martin government fell and Stephen Harper  
became Prime Minister after the January 2006 election. A central issue in 
the campaign was the Gomery Commission and ethical government. 
Prime Minister Harper and his Conservative Party were elected in  
January 2006 with the campaign slogan “Demand Better” and promised 
sweeping democratic reforms. Accountability and transparency were  
central themes in the Speech from the Throne in 2006 and in the Prime 
Minister’s response to it.139 One of the new Government’s first orders of 
business was to enact the Accountability Act.
140
  
As described earlier, the Harper government literally picked up from 
where the Martin government had left off, appointing Marshall Rothstein 
from the shortlist submitted to Liberal Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler. The 
Harper government explicitly added the parliamentary hearing as a “Process 
designed to increase openness and accountability”.141 Importantly, the an-
nouncement by the Prime Minister added an additional justification for the 
parliamentary hearings, stating that “The Supreme Court is a vital institution 
that belongs to all Canadians ... the public deserves to know more about the 
individuals appointed to serve there, and the method by which they are  
appointed. ...”142 These three themes: (1) openness or transparency;  
                                                                                                             
– Most votes in the House of Commons are now free votes, in which MPs can  
represent the views of their constituents as they see fit. Since Paul Martin became 
Prime Minister, 72% of House votes have been free votes.  
– Parliamentarians now have the authority to review most senior government  
appointments, including those of heads of Crown Corporations.  
– The government has committed that Parliament will play a role in reviewing  
Supreme Court appointments. 
139 See Canada, Speech from the Throne to Open the First Session of the 39th Parliament of 
Canada, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications& 
doc=aarchives/sft-ddt/2006-eng.htm>; and Prime Minister of Canada, “Turning a New Leaf: Notes 
for an Address by the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister of Canada, In Support of 
Measures Contained in The Speech from the Throne” (April 5, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/ 
eng/news/2006/04/05/prime-minister-backs-speech-throne>. 
140 Bill C-2, An Act providing for conflict of interest rules, restrictions on election financing 
and measures respecting administrative transparency, oversight and accountability, S.C. 2006, c. 9. 
141 Prime Minister of Canada, “News Release: Supreme Court Nominee to Face Questions 
from Parliamentarians” (February 20, 2006), online: <http://pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2006/02/20/supreme- 
court-nominee-face-questions-parliamentarians>. 
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(2) accountability; and (3) learning about the individuals appointed to serve 
on the Supreme Court were repeated by Minister of Justice Toews at the par-
liamentary hearing for Justice Rothstein and in the announcements, 
appointments and parliamentary hearings in 2011, 2012 and 2013.
143
 
4. Public Perception of the Supreme Court of Canada  
In the epigraph at the beginning of this paper, Irwin Cotler linked 
concerns about the integrity and fairness of the appointment process to 
the independence of the judiciary. While this linkage is correct as a mat-
ter of theory and at times and places as a matter of fact as well, it is 
important to acknowledge that public dissatisfaction with the Supreme 
Court of Canada was not a driver of reforms to the appointments process 
over the past decade.
144
  
Academics who studied media coverage of the Supreme Court between 
2000 and 2001 opined that “the Supreme Court has dominated the Canadian 
political landscape in terms of its credibility and prestige”.145 While this has 
not been the case throughout the Supreme Court’s history, it does accurately 
describe the place of the Supreme Court over the last 30 years. Public opin-
ion polls in the 1980s and 1990s consistently showed high levels of support 
for the Supreme Court as an institution,
146
 especially compared to other 
                                                                                                             
143 See supra, notes 58, 61 and 62. The anomalous appointment process of Justice Cromwell. 
in 2008 is discussed in Part II, supra.  
144 Professor Cotler identified six factors as providing the impetus for reform: (1) the impact of the 
Charter as transforming the legal and political landscape in Canada; (2) the centrality of the Supreme Court 
of Canada in this “constitutional revolution”, which elevated the profile of “unelected, unrepresentative, 
and unaccountable judges” allegedly usurping the democratic decision-making process; (3) “the perception 
of an ‘activist Court’ propagating ‘liberal values’”; (4) “the dynamic of judicial decision-making intruding 
upon, if not overtaking policy decisions that ought to be made by Parliament;” (5) fallout from the Gomery 
Commission that was extended to the judicial appointments process because it implicated Liberal-
appointed Federal Court judges; and (6) “the perceived anomaly of the executive — effectively the Prime 
Minister — making appointments to the Supreme Court alone, without any Parliamentary input or 
accountability”. Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 133. This 
explanation provides the immediate context for the reforms in 2004-2006. 
145 Florian Sauvageau, David Schneiderman & David Taras, The Last Word: Media 
Coverage of the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006), at 26 [hereinafter 
“Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras”]. 
146 A Focus Canada survey of the justice system in 1989 found a high level of support for the 
Supreme Court. Seventy-six per cent of respondents indicated “a lot” or “some” confidence in the 
Supreme Court. Shirley Ouellet, Public Attitudes towards the Legitimacy of Our Institutions and the 
Administration of Justice (Ottawa: Department of Justice, Canada, Research and Development 
Directorate, 1991) [hereinafter “Ouellet”]; Supreme Court of Canada Microlog no. 96-00418; the 
same level of support is reported in Julian Roberts, Public Confidence in Criminal Justice: A Review 
of Recent Trends, 2004-05: A Report for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada 
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branches of government.
147
 A 1989 poll found that a majority of Canadians 
had confidence in the Supreme Court to make appropriate Charter deci-
sions.
148
 A 1999 survey specifically investigating support of the Supreme 
Court revealed that of those respondents who were aware of the Supreme 
Court,
149
 76.6 per cent expressed support for the high court.
150
 
Sauvageau, Schneiderman and Taras report that a 2001 Gallup poll indi-
cated that the Supreme Court enjoyed the greatest respect from Canadians 
compared to almost all other Canadian institutions, including federal and 
provincial governments and the House of Commons.
151
 Supreme Court 
commentators noted the high levels of public support when proposing 
changes to the appointment process. In a 2000 symposium on judicial ap-
pointments, Professor F.C. DeCoste stated that “[s]o far as the citizenry is 
concerned, our judges appear to be enjoying substantial popular support.”152 
Even attacks on the Supreme Court for “judicial activism” did not 
have a significant impact on public support for the Supreme Court as an 
institution.
153
 While support for the outcomes in specific cases has been 
found to be somewhat linked to approval of the Supreme Court as an in-
stitution, it does not have significant impact on that widespread 
                                                                                                             
(Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 2004), at 13, online: <http://www.publicsafety. 
gc.ca/cnt/rsrcs/pblctns/pblc-cnfdnc-crmnl/index-eng.aspx>. 
147 A different Focus Canada Poll in 1988 found that 59 per cent of respondents were “very” 
or “somewhat” satisfied with the federal government. Ouellett, id., at 5. 
148 Id., at 11. Ouellet does not report the exact number.  
149 A total of 76.3 per cent of respondents were “somewhat” or “very” aware of the Supreme 
Court of Canada. See Joseph Fletcher & Paul Howe, “Public Opinion and the Courts” in Paul Howe 
& Peter H. Russell, eds., Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005) 255, at 265 [hereinafter “Fletcher & Howe”]. The data cited in this 
paragraph are from a 1999 Institute for Research on Public Policy poll which Fletcher and Howe 
designed in 1999. Elsewhere in the article they also use data from an unnamed 1987 “academic 
survey”. 
150 Fletcher & Howe, id. When differentiated by region, Quebec scored the lowest on both of 
these points: only 42 per cent awareness and 69.8 per cent satisfaction. Fletcher & Howe, id., at 265. 
The data cited in this paragraph are from a 1999 Institute for Research on Public Policy poll which 
Fletcher and Howe designed in 1999. Elsewhere in the article they also use data from an unnamed 
1987 “academic survey”.  
151 Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 145, at 26-27, citing Josephine Mazzuca, 
“Armed forces, Supreme Court and public schools top institutional list for respect and confidence” 
(May 28, 2001) 61Gallup Poll 30. 
152 F.C. DeCoste, “Introduction” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 60, at 608. He cited polls from 
1999 that showed that 62 per cent of Canadians supported judicial over parliamentary supremacy 
and that 77 per cent of Canadians were favourably disposed to the Supreme Court of Canada. Janice 
Tibbetts, “Judges should have final say, poll suggests” The Edmonton Journal (April 14, 1999) A3 
[hereinafter “Tibbetts, ‘Judges should have final say’”], cited in F.C. DeCoste, id., at 608. 
153 Fletcher & Howe, supra, note 149. 
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support.
154
 Similarly, while political views influence opinions about spe-
cific Supreme Court decisions and may indirectly reduce support for the 
Supreme Court,
155
 a high level of support for the Court persists, even 
among people who disagree with the outcome of high-profile cases.
156
  
Public support for the Supreme Court remained high into the 2000s. 
Ipsos-Reid data from the early years of the decade found that 70 per cent 
of respondents approved of the Supreme Court’s actions “over the past 
year or so”.157 Interestingly, despite this strong approval, the same poll 
found that only 10 per cent of Canadians believed that the Supreme 
Court was completely free of any political influence, while 84 per cent 
thought the Court’s decisions were influenced by partisan politics “to 
some degree”.158 A 2010 Environics poll also found high support for the 
Supreme Court. The poll found that the Supreme Court (together with the 
military and the justice system) enjoyed ongoing, relatively high levels 
of confidence. The Supreme Court had a 69 per cent confidence level, 
down three per cent from the Environics 2007 poll. In contrast, Parlia-
ment and political parties enjoyed lower levels of confidence and 
were declining faster: Parliament enjoyed 42 per cent confidence, down  
                                                                                                             
154 Lori Hausegger & Troy Riddell, “The Changing Nature of Public Support for the 
Supreme Court of Canada” (2004) 37:1 Can. J. Poli. Sci. 23, at 24-25. Their exact phrasing in their 
conclusion is that they found “some support” for this hypothesis. Fletcher & Howe, id., at 281. 
155 Fletcher & Howe, id., at 229.  
156 Fletcher & Howe, id. Among people who disagreed with the outcome of all three cases 
(a total 10 per cent of respondents), 58 per cent of them agreed that the Supreme Court, not 
Parliament, should have the last word on constitutional review. Id., at 284. 
157 Darrell Bricker & John Wright, What Canadians Think About Almost Everything 
(Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2005), at 14. The book does not mention the exact year the data was 
recorded, only that this time period “includes the controversial Robert Latimer appeal”, and 
therefore it must be 2002, or possibly 2001 as Latimer was decided by the Supreme Court in 2001. 
See R. v. Latimer, [2001] S.C.J. No. 1, 2001 SCC 1, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). Thanks to Emily 
Alderson for this deduction and for her excellent research in this section generally. Contrary to 
Fletcher and Howe’s findings, support for the Supreme Court’s actions was highest in Quebec 
(77 per cent). Paradoxically, Quebec is also ranked the province the “most likely to oppose an SCC 
decision”. Id., at 15. Support for the Supreme Court’s actions was lowest in Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba (62 per cent), although this may be due to the recently concluded case of Robert Latimer, a 
Saskatchewan resident. Fully 59 per cent of Canadians disagreed with the Supreme Court’s decision 
to uphold his sentence. Although Bricker and Wright do not hypothesize on reasons for Supreme 
Court support, this may be another instance where specific support has some mild impact on diffuse 
support. Bricker and Wright break down Supreme Court approval by demographics: approval 
increases with education (78 per cent among university graduates and 59 per cent among those with 
a high school education), and with income (74 per cent among those earning above $30,000 annually 
and 65 per cent among those earning less). Id., at 15. 
158 Id.  
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13 per cent from 2007, and political parties were once again the least con-
fidence-inspiring at 19 per cent, down 13 per cent.
159
  
Conversely, polls show a high level of dissatisfaction with the ap-
pointment process for Supreme Court judges and even a desire for judges 
to be elected.
160
 Thus, public opinion polls reveal what might be consid-
ered a paradox: a high level of public support for the Supreme Court but 
a desire for change in the appointment process.
161
 This may represent 
inconsistent public opinion, which is not unusual, or it might reflect pub-
lic sophistication in terms of dissatisfaction with the process of 
appointment rather than with the results. 
Reforms to the appointments process were not a response to any per-
ception that the persons appointed had been problematic in some way.
162
 
Reflecting on his experience as Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotler wrote 
that the Supreme Court of Canada “is respected across the country and 
around the world as a model of what a vital, modern, and independent 
judicial institution should be”.163 According to the Minister of Justice 
who began the reform process, the existing process had produced excel-
lent appointees.
164
 While it is easy to dismiss such statements as political 
rhetoric, the thrust of the political discourse over the past 25 years has 
been about empowering Parliament and reining in the Prime Minister, 
not changing the Supreme Court. 
Thus, when Minister Cotler appeared at the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Supreme Court of Canada Appointments in August 2004 after the  
appointment of Justices Abella and Charron, he commented that the ap-
pointments process “has been critiqued not with regard to the quality of 
appointments, but with respect to the lack of transparency and Parlia-
mentary input. And, yes, there has been a lack of transparency, an 
absence of Parliamentary input, and very little by way of public  
                                                                                                             
159 Environics, Focus Canada (2010), at 19, online: <http://www.queensu.ca/cora/_files/fc2010 
report.pdf>.  
160 Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 145, citing Chris Cobb, “Canadians want 
to elect court” National Post (February 4, 2002) A1. 
161 See Tibbetts, “Judges should have final say”, supra, note 152 (noting that only 8 per cent 
of Canadians support the way in which judges are appointed). 
162 See Alarie & Green, “Policy Preference”, supra, note 43, at para. 2: “the evidence shows 
that the judicial appointments process to the Supreme Court has been satisfactory”; Rory Leishman, 
“No Need for Radical Reform of the Federal Judicial Appointment Process” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 
112, at 120; Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2.  
163 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, id., at 132. 
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involvement.” According to then-Minister Cotler, that is what his  
government was “seeking to reform and rectify”.165  
IV. AUDIT 
This section analyzes the reforms between 2004 and 2013 in terms of 
(1) transparency; (2) accountability; and (3) the promotion of public 
knowledge about the work of the Supreme Court of Canada and its judg-
es. The first two factors are linked because transparency is not an end in 
itself; it is a necessary pre-condition for ensuring accountability.
166
 
Transparency relates to the openness of the process whereas accountabil-
ity involves explanation for actions or decisions. 
Accountability is an important feature of responsible government un-
der the Canadian Constitution.
167
 Individual ministers “are accountable to 
Parliament for the exercise of the powers, duties and functions vested in 
them by statute or otherwise”.168 Under our parliamentary system of gov-
ernment, accountability “derives directly from the responsibility of 
ministers”.169 The Ministry is collectively accountable for all the policies 
and actions of the government; ministers “must be prepared to explain and 
defend the Government’s policies before Parliament at all times”.170 This is 
accountability in the constitutional sense, but accountability may be  
understood in a broader sense as “a means of making responsible the exer-
cise of power”.171 In her testimony before the Gomery Commission, 
                                                                                                             
165 Department of Justice, Speeches, Speaking Notes for Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice 
and Attorney General of Canada on the Occasion of a Presentation to the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Supreme Court Appointments” (August 25, 2004), online: <http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/ 
webarchives/20071116083626/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc_31212.html> 
[hereinafter “Speaking Notes”]. 
166 For example, Dean Sossin has asserted that “[a]n accountability culture suggests a focus 
both on transparent criteria for selection and justification to ensure that the criteria were 
appropriately applied.” Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81, at 39.  
167 See Canada, Privy Council Office, Responsibility in the Constitution, “Constitutional 
Responsibility and Accountability”, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page= 
information&sub=publications&doc=constitution/table-eng.htm> Part VII [hereinafter “Responsibility in 
the Constitution”]. 
168 Canada, Privy Council Office, Accountable Government: A Guide for Ministers and 
Ministers of State (2011), at 2 [hereinafter “Accountable Government”]. 
169 Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167, “The Principles of Accountability”, at 
Part VIII. 
170 Accountable Government, supra, note 168, at iv.  
171 Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167, at Part VIII. On accountability 
generally, see Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans, eds., The Oxford Handbook 
of Public Accountability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
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Jocelyn Bourgon, Canada’s former top civil servant, explained that “where 
authority resides, so resides accountability, and if one has authority to 
strike a decision, then one has an obligation to provide an account”.172 
Transparency is but one means of making responsible the exercise of 
power. Thus, in auditing accountability, we will seek to evaluate the extent 
to which the process makes those responsible for the exercise of power 
through the appointment process explain or account for such decisions.  
1. Transparency 
In terms of transparency, we seek to evaluate the availability of in-
formation about the operation of the appointment process. We seek to 
understand factors including the following: (1) how the process works; 
(2) the criteria for selection; (3) who is consulted; (4) the role of the pub-
lic; (5) how the Minister of Justice prepares the so-called “long list”, and 
how many names are on it; (6) what the Selection Panel does; and  
(7) who makes the ultimate decision. When these questions are consid-
ered, the inevitable conclusion is that we know much less about the 
process in 2014 than we did a decade ago when Justices Abella and 
Charron were appointed to the Court. The continuing controversy  
surrounding the appointment of Justice Nadon in 2013-2014 has demon-
strated just how opaque the appointment process has become.  
(a)  How Does the Process Work? 
Since the reforms were initiated in 2004, no government has pub-
lished comprehensive guidelines on how the selection process works. 
Since the Rothstein appointment, the transparency of the appointment 
process has been significantly reduced. The only information known 
about the process is what the Prime Minister has announced in successive 
press releases: 
•  To identify a pool of qualified candidates for appointment to the Su-
preme Court of Canada, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
will consult with the Ontario Attorney General, as well as leading 
members of the legal community. Members of the public are invited 
                                                                                                             
172 Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Sponsorship Program and Advertising Activities 
(The Hon. John Gomery, Commissioner) (Ottawa), vol. 47, December 8, 2004, at 8235, quoted in 
Savoie, supra, note 117, at 257. 
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to submit their input with respect to qualified candidates who merit 
consideration at www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html.  
•  The list of qualified candidates will be reviewed by a selection panel 
composed of five Members of Parliament — including three Mem-
bers from the Government Caucus and one Member from each of the 
recognized Opposition Caucuses, as selected by their respective 
leaders — to review the list of qualified candidates.  
•  The Supreme Court Selection Panel will be responsible to assess the 
candidates and provide an unranked short list of six qualified candi-
dates to the Prime Minister of Canada and the Minister of Justice for 
their consideration.  
•  The two selected nominees will appear at a public hearing of an ad 
hoc parliamentary committee to answer questions of Members of 
Parliament. This is a process that was first established for the  
appointment of the Honourable Mr. Justice Marshall E. Rothstein  
in 2006.
173
 
This limited information about the operation of the process is deficient, 
as will become apparent in the successive sections. 
(b)  What Are the Criteria for Selection? 
There has been a decrease in transparency in terms of publication of 
the criteria for selection since the reforms began in 2004. Under the ten-
ure of Minister of Justice Cotler, such criteria were clearly articulated as: 
professional capacity;
174
 personal characteristics;
175
 and diversity on the 
                                                                                                             
173 Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, supra, note 58. See also Prime 
Minister of Canada, “Marie Deschamps”, supra, note 61; and Prime Minister of Canada, “Justice 
Morris Fish”, supra, note 62. 
174 Professional capacity included: (1) “the highest level of proficiency in the law, superior 
intellectual ability and analytical and written skills;” (2) “proven ability to listen and to maintain an 
open mind while hearing all sides of an argument;” (3) “decisiveness and soundness of judgement;” 
(4) “capacity to manage and share consistently heavy workload in a collaborative context;”  
(5) “capacity to manage stress and the pressures of the isolation of the judicial role;” (6) “strong 
cooperative interpersonal skills;” (7) “awareness of social context;” (8) “bilingual capacity;” and  
(9) “specific expertise required for the Supreme Court.” Speaking Notes, supra, note 165.  
175 Personal characteristics included: (1) highest level of personal and professional ethics: 
“honesty; integrity; candour;” (2) “respect and consideration for others: patience; courtesy; tact; 
humility; fairness; tolerance;” and (3) “personal sense of responsibility: common sense; punctuality; 
reliability.” Id. 
150 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Court.
176
 Since 2006, the criteria for evaluating candidates for appointment 
are no longer published by the government.  
In each of the appointments in each of 2006, 2011, 2012 and 2013, 
Peter Hogg or Jean-Louis Baudouin identified qualities that they 
believed Supreme Court justices should have.
177
 The list of qualities 
differed as between Professors Hogg and Baudouin, which is problematic 
in and of itself. Moreover, there is no indication that the qualities 
identified by Professors Hogg and Baudouin were used by the Minister 
of Justice in creating the long list, by the Selection Panel in creating the 
short list of candidates, or by the Minister of Justice and the Prime 
Minister in selecting the nominee. Additionally, the articulation of the 
qualifications shows the important link between transparency and 
accountability. If the parliamentary hearings are supposed to serve an 
accountability function, it becomes difficult for MPs to fulfil this 
function if the criteria for selecting candidates — which should then 
become the criteria for evaluating the nominee — are unknown or 
articulated only at the beginning of the parliamentary hearing.  
(c)  Who Is Consulted and What Is the Nature of those Consultations? 
We do now know the people who are consulted for their opinions 
about potential candidates for appointment. In 2004, Minister of Justice 
Cotler explained that he consulted with the following individuals: 
 the Chief Justice of Canada, Beverley McLachlin; 
 the Attorney General of Ontario, Michael Bryant; 
 the Chief Justice of Ontario, Roy McMurtry; 
 the Treasurer of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Frank Marrocco; 
 the President of the Canadian Bar Association, William Johnson; and 
 the President of the Ontario Bar Association, Jonathan Spiegel.178 
                                                                                                             
176 Id. As discussed in Part III, there is no indication that the criteria were actually used by 
Minister Cotler or by subsequent selection panels. 
177 See Rothstein Transcript (2006) [hereinafter “Rothstein Transcript”]; Moldaver & 
Karakatsanis Transcript; Wagner Transcript; and Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84. See also Hogg, 
“Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49, at 538.  
178 Speaking Notes, supra, note 165. In his appearance before the Justice Committee in 
March 2004, Cotler explained that he would consult with the following individuals: 
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Similar explanations have been provided by successive Ministers of  
Justice in each of the appointments since 2004.
179
 
To say that certain people were consulted in making a decision does 
not reveal the quality of those consultations.
180
 Tom Kent has asked: 
“How wide are the consultations that precede the decision, what consid-
erations are weighed, what alternatives considered …?”181 In the absence 
of published criteria for appointment and consultation guidelines,
182
 we 
do not know the answers.  
There are consultations and then there are consultations. A consulta-
tion may be a pro forma affair wherein the person being consulted is 
asked for suggestions which are then politely filed away. Such appears to 
have been the case with the federal government’s consultation with the 
Attorney General of Quebec over the Nadon appointment.
183
 Consulta-
tions may also be a true dialogue: a discussion and an exchange of ideas. 
Such was clearly the case in the summer of 2004 in the case of discus-
sions between Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada Irwin 
Cotler and the Ontario Attorney General over the two pending appointments 
to the Supreme Court from Ontario.
184
 
                                                                                                             
 the Chief Justice of Canada and perhaps other members of the Supreme Court of Canada;  
 the Chief Justices of the courts of the relevant region;  
 the Attorneys General of the relevant region;  
 at least one senior member of the Canadian Bar Association; 
 at least one senior member of the Law Society of the relevant region. 
179 See Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177; Karakatsanis & Moldaver Transcript; Wagner 
Transcript; and Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84. 
180 For an especially biting commentary on the nature of consultations, see the commentary 
by University of Toronto law professor Douglas Sanderson, “Welcome to My World – Consultation 
and Canada Post”, Ultra Vires (January 29, 2014), online: <http://ultravires.ca/2014/01/welcome-to-
my-world-consultation-and-canada-post/>. 
181 Kent, supra, note 104, at 96. 
182 See, e.g., Ontario, Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, Draft Guidelines for Ministries on 
Consultation with Aboriginal Peoples Related to Aboriginal Rights and Treaty Rights (June 2006), 
online: <http://docs.files.ontario.ca/documents/258/3-maa-draft-guidelines-for-ministries-on.pdf>. 
183 See Paul Journet, “Le Québec lésé par le retrait du juge Nadon, dénonce Cloutier” La Presse 
(October 9, 2013), quoted in Irwin Cotler, P.C., M.P. & Charlie Feldman, “Supreme Court Appointments: 
When and How Should Parliament Exercise Oversight?” (March 2014) 8 J.P.P.L. 253, at 277. 
184 As Carissima Mathen notes, in his appearance before the ad hoc committee in August 
2004, Minister Cotler noted that he spoke to some people, including Ontario Attorney General 
Michael Bryant, several times about various candidates. See Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, 
supra, note 14, at 57, note 26. In 2004, I was serving as Senior Policy Adviser to the Attorney 
General of Ontario Michael Bryant, and although I did not participate in any discussions between the 
two Attorneys General, I can certainly attest that such discussions took place, on more than one 
occasion, and from my perspective they appeared to be real, substantive discussions of the merits of 
various candidates for the country’s highest court.  
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On the nature or the quality of the consultations, we also know less 
in 2014 than we did in 2004. In 2004, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler 
explained the consultations that he had undertaken thusly: 
In order to assess the candidates, I met with each of the people I 
mentioned earlier. Indeed, I consulted them several times so as to verify 
information which I had received and to assess whether a point of view 
expressed by one person was shared by the others. Potential candidates 
may have been identified later on in the process, at which point I would 
again go back and seek the views of people I had previously spoken to. 
I point this out to suggest that the consultations were not a one-shot 
exchange where I spoke to each person once and that’s it. Rather, there 
was an ongoing and overlapping dialogue between me and the other 
consultees. 
In assessing the candidates, I asked questions that were related to the 
criteria mentioned earlier. 
Again, I cannot stress enough that the main focus was merit. Although 
my discussions were confidential, I can tell you that some of the 
consultees were particularly well-placed to provide certain types of 
input — for example, the Chief Justice of Canada on the expertise 
required for the Court; the Chief Justice of Ontario on issues such as 
collegiality and ability to handle a heavy workload; and the Attorney 
General of Ontario; the Law Society; and the CBA on the candidate’s 
reputation in the legal community.
185
  
Minister Cotler explained that he had personally read the opinions and 
writings of the candidates.
186
  
(d)  What Role Does the Public Play?  
Several Ministers of Justice writing after the fact have claimed that 
members of the public were always free to provide their views of prospec-
tive candidates to the Minister.
187
 In 2005, when Justice Major announced 
his retirement from the bench, Minister of Justice Irwin Cotler invited public 
                                                                                                             
185 Speeches, Speaking Notes, supra, note 165. 
186 Id. This is perhaps not surprising given that Minister Cotler was a law professor with a 
reputation for reading broadly. 
187 See The Honourable Anne A. McLellan, P.C., “The ‘New’ Selection Process”, 31:3  
Law Matters (June 2006) 4; and Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2,  
at 137.  
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input
188
 and also took the unprecedented step of running advertisements in 
daily newspapers in the Western provinces (Manitoba, Saskatchewan and 
Alberta) from where Justice Major’s replacement was likely to come.189 The 
advertisements invited written representations from “any person or group, to 
propose candidates for appointment to the Supreme Court”.190 It is not 
known whether the Minister received any submissions from members of the 
public or what the contents of any such submissions were. 
Beginning with the 2011 vacancies, the Minister of Justice explicitly 
sought public input in the process. When Justices Binnie and Charron 
announced their retirement in May 2011, the Prime Minister issued a 
statement setting out the process which included the following element: 
To identify a pool of qualified candidates for appointment to the 
Supreme Court of Canada, the Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
will consult with the Ontario Attorney General, as well as leading 
members of the legal community. Members of the public are invited to 
submit their input with respect to qualified candidates who merit 
consideration at www.justice.gc.ca/eng/scc-csc.html.
191
 
When Justices Karakatsanis and Moldaver appeared before the 
committee of parliamentarians in October 2011, the Minister of Justice 
asserted that “Members of the public were also included in this process 
and were provided the opportunity to submit input with respect to qualified 
candidates who would merit consideration.”192 
I remain deeply skeptical about the public input element for several 
reasons. First, the public outreach is limited and generally passive; it is 
very Web 1.0. Members of the public are invited to e-mail their views to a 
Justice Canada e-mail account. There is no outreach or public consultation 
with members of the public who might be knowledgeable about prospec-
tive candidates: lawyers and lawyers’ organizations.193 Second, members 
of the public are generally not familiar with Supreme Court nominees and 
                                                                                                             
188 Canada, Department of Justice, News Release, “Justice Minister Invites Public Input Concern-
ing Supreme Court of Canada Vacancy” (August 30, 2005), online: <http://www.collectionscanada. 
gc.ca/webarchives/20071116084213/http://www.canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31614.html>. 
189 See, e.g., Winnipeg Free Press (August 31, 2005) A6. 
190 Id. 
191 Prime Minister of Canada, “Upcoming Retirement”, supra, note 58. 
192 Nadon Transcript, supra, note 84. Almost identical language was used by Minister of Justice 
Nicholson at Justice Wagner’s hearing in 2012 and at Justice Moldaver’s and Justice Karakatsanis’ hearing 
in 2011. See Wagner Transcript, supra, note 84; Moldaver and Karakatsanis Transcript, id.  
193 Ministers of justice have claimed that they have consulted with heads of selected legal 
organizations, but this cannot be considered broad-based consultation with members of the legal 
community, let alone “public consultation”. 
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the Minister of Justice is unlikely to get much substantive input that would 
actually be useful.
194
 Third, it is not clear that the Minister of Justice does 
anything with the public input, let alone passes it along for consideration to 
the Supreme Court Selection Panel for its consideration or to the parlia-
mentary committee. There is no public summary provided of the public 
input. It thus appears to me that the sole reason for the invitation to mem-
bers of the public is to enable the Minister of Justice to claim that members 
of the public participated in the process. 
(e)  How Does the Minister of Justice Prepare the So-Called “Long List” 
and How Many Names Are on the “Long List”? 
The amount of disclosure of the process has differed across time.  
The most disclosure occurred with the appointment of Justice Rothstein 
and it has decreased over time. 
Thus, at the beginning of the process that led to the appointment of  
Justice Rothstein, Minister of Justice Cotler stated that he would submit a 
                                                                                                             
194 To test my assumption, I made an access request for 2011 requesting the following:  
1. Number of e-mails received by Department of Justice in connection with May 13, 2011 
announcement from the Prime Minister soliciting input into nomination process for  
Supreme Court of Canada judges to send e-mails to SCC_Selection_Process@justice.gc.ca; 2. 
Copies of contents of all e-mails received by [this e-mail address] between May 13, 2011 and 
September 30, 2011; and 3. Copies of all memoranda, analysis, documents, etc. in connection 
with any public input into the Supreme Court of Canada appointment process May 1st to 
September 30, 2011. 
I received 81 pages of correspondence in response to my request. No records were withheld 
(names were blocked out under s. 19(1) of the Access to Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-1 (personal 
information)). There were no memoranda, analysis or briefing notes in connection with the 
correspondence, which leads me to believe that nothing was done with it. There was no indication that 
the public input was fed into the decision-making process in any way. Of the 81 pages, most of letters or 
e-mails consisted of members of the public generally dissatisfied with the legal system in some way. 
These 81 pages included routing slips, draft responses and responses from the Minister of Justice. All 
told, there were only 18 public responses. Only several are notable. The batônnier of the Barreau du 
Québec wrote to the Prime Minister on June 21, 2011 advocating the importance of candidates’ ability 
to hear cases in both official languages without the aide of an interpreter: Letter from the Barreau du 
Québec to Prime Minister Stephen Harper, dated June 21, 2011 (on file with author). One e-mailer 
stated that “…the Chief and Rosalie [Abella] must go. Send them on international mission to spread 
democracy in third world country.” E-mail to the Hon. Rob Nicholson, dated June 22, 2011 (on file 
with author). Only one member of the public actually recommended candidates from Ontario (one other 
recommended a judge from New Brunswick). A thoughtful lawyer who claimed to be “a current 
practitioner in, and follower, of the [Supreme] Court” recommended two members of the Ontario Court 
of Appeal and gave a paragraph explanation for each judge as to why they would be good Supreme 
Court judges. See E-mail to the Honourable Robert Nicholson, Minister of Justice and Attorney General 
of Canada, dated May 17, 2011 (on file with author).  
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list of five to eight names to the Advisory Committee.
195
 At Justice  
Rothstein’s hearing, Minister of Justice Toews explained that his prede-
cessor Irwin Cotler had submitted a list of six candidates to the advisory 
committee to produce an unranked shortlist of three.
196
 In none of the 
subsequent appointments has the Minister of Justice disclosed how many 
names he provided to the Supreme Court Selection Panel. 
(f)  What Does the Selection Panel Do and How Does it Work? 
Some information about the work of the Supreme Court Selection 
Panel is available through the Office of the Commissioner for Federal 
Judicial Affairs (“FJA”) which supports the work of the Selection Panel. 
Thus, the FJA website explains that in July 2013, the Selection Panel 
“was provided with examples of decisions written by each of the candi-
dates put forward to replace the Honourable Morris J. Fish at the 
Supreme Court of Canada”.197 The FJA further explains:  
Each candidate was asked to identify 5 decisions for particular 
consideration by the Panel, preferably dealing with issues coming 
within the usual scope of the Supreme Court of Canada. These 
decisions were to address issues requiring a consideration of principles 
and policy in novel contexts rather than decisions where the dispute is 
primarily factual. As far as possible, the choice of the 5 decisions was 
to reflect at least one of each of the following areas of law: 
Constitutional law (Charter or Federalism); Criminal law (or national 
security); Civil law; Administrative law; and the Candidate’s choice.
198
  
The website then provided the names, citations and links to the five deci-
sions that Justice Nadon had provided to the Selection Panel.
199
 Similar 
information was available for the appointments in 2011 and 2012. 
                                                                                                             
195 See Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 144-45. 
196 Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. 
197 Office of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs, Supreme Court Nomination, 
Examples of Decisions, Note [hereinafter “Examples of Decisions”] (available on request from the Office 
of the Commissioner for Federal Judicial Affairs and on file with author). In a 2014 article, former Minister 
of Justice Irwin Cotler provides the table of contents for a “binder” that MPs on the Nadon Supreme Court 
Selection Panel reportedly received. See Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 275. 
198 Examples of Decisions, id. 
199 Id. Those decisions were Martin v. Canada (Attorney General), [2013] F.C.J. No. 51, 
2013 FCA 15 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 122 (S.C.C.); Siemens Canada 
Ltd. v. J.D. Irving Ltd., [2012] F.C.J. No. 1120, 2012 FCA 225 (F.C.A.); Canada (Attorney General) 
v. Jodhan, [2012] F.C.J. No. 614, 2012 FCA 161 (F.C.A.); Mercier v. Canada (Correctional 
Service), [2010] F.C.J. No. 816, [2012] 1 F.C.R. 72, 2010 FCA 167 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal refused 
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It has not been made clear on what basis the selection panels conduct 
their work. It is not clear whether they work by consensus or majority vote. 
For the nomination of Justices Karakatsanis and Moldaver in 2011, 
Minister of Justice Nicholson stated that “[t]he list of six candidates, which 
included the two nominees, was unanimously approved by the panel”.200 
Similar language was used by the Minister of Justice for the nomination of 
Justice Wagner in 2012,
201
 but was absent in the nomination of Justice 
Rothstein in 2006 and Justice Nadon in 2013.
202
 Subsequent comments by 
one member of the selection committee for Justice Nadon’s appointment 
assert that confidentiality prohibits members of the panel from even dis-
closing how it operates.
203
 The government has simply not made clear the 
basis upon which the shortlist is reached. 
(g) Who Makes the Ultimate Decision?  
Where once it was unclear who actually makes the final decision for ap-
pointment, it is now clear that the decision is the Prime Minister’s, advised 
by the Minister of Justice. While some scholars have asserted that puisne 
judges are appointed on the recommendation of the Minister of Justice and 
the appointment of the Chief Justice is the Prime Minister’s prerogative,204 
subsequent Ministers of Justice have clearly indicated that the selection of all 
justices of the Supreme Court is the choice of the Prime Minister.
205
 
                                                                                                             
[2010] S.C.C.A. No. 331 (S.C.C.); and Khadr v. Canada (Prime Minister), [2009] F.C.J. No. 893, 
[2010] 1 F.C.R. 73, 2009 FCA 246 (F.C.A.). 
200 Moldaver & Karakatsanis Transcript, supra, note 84. 
201 Wagner Transcript, id.: “A list of three candidates, which included our nominee, were 
unanimously approved by the panel.” 
202 Nadon Transcript, id.: “the selection panel completed their report and submitted this unranked 
list that I referred to of three qualified candidates, which of course included our nominee, Marc Nadon.” 
203 NDP MP Françoise Boivin, who was a member of the Supreme Court Selection Panel, 
stated that confidentiality prohibited her from even disclosing how the panel operated. See Twitter, 
@FBoivinNPD, online: <https://twitter.com/FBoivinNPD/status/396800646881370113>: “You dont 
sign off. It could be unanimous, it could be majority.Cant tell coz of confidentiality!” 
204 See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85, at 763, citing S.I. Bushnell, “The 
Appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of Canada: Past, Present and Future” in Judicial 
Selection in Canada: Discussion Papers and Reports (Canadian Association of Law Teachers 
Special Committee on the Appointment of Judges, 1987), at 1. 
205 See McLellan, “Foreword”, supra, note 64, at 604; and Cotler, “The Supreme Court 
Appointment Process”, supra, note 2. See Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177; Karakatsanis & 
Moldaver Transcript, supra, note 84; Wagner Transcript, supra, note 84; and Nadon Transcript, 
supra, note 84. See also Tonda MacCharles, “Supreme Court pick defends qualifications”, supra, 
note 64 (stating that Justice Minister Peter MacKay noted that the selection of Supreme Court 
justices was the decision of the Prime Minister). 
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At each of the four committee hearings, the Minister of Justice ex-
plicitly stated that the “Governor in Council will act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister”.206 At the Rothstein hearing, Justice Minister Toews ex-
plained that the committee was charged “with providing advice to the 
Prime Minister. He has undertaken to take into account the deliberations 
and views of the committee in deciding whether or not to proceed with 
the appointment of Justice Rothstein.” In 2006, it was reported that the 
Prime Minister watched the hearings on television. It is unknown wheth-
er he watched the subsequent hearings.
207
 
(h)  Conclusion: A Transparency Deficit 
The reformed Supreme Court appointment process provides many 
opportunities for disclosure: prior to a vacancy being announced; when a 
vacancy is announced; when the nominee is announced; during the pub-
lic hearing; and at the moment of formal appointment by the Prime 
Minister. Despite frequent and repeated claims by successive governments 
about the openness and transparency in the process, we have seen that 
more is unknown about the process than is known. I am not alone in con-
cluding that the process is wanting in transparency.
208
 Writing years after 
the Rothstein hearing but before the 2011 appointments, Supreme Court 
observer Philip Slayton concluded that “the private nature of the current 
practice leads to public suspicion and skepticism”.209 I am not sure that 
substantial change has occurred since Slayton wrote those words that 
would lead him to change his assessment. My audit of the reforms since 
2004 leads me to conclude that they have not fostered significant change 
in transparency: there is still a serious transparency deficit in the  
Supreme Court appointment process. As discussed in the next section, 
the public hearings have failed to address this transparency deficit. 
                                                                                                             
206 Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. 
207 In 2013, the Prime Minister departed for Indonesia the day after the Nadon hearing. See 
Prime Minister of Canada, Media Advisories, “Public event for Prime Minister Stephen Harper for 
Thursday, October 3rd”, October 2, 2013, online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/news/2013/10/02/ public- 
event-october-3-2013>. 
208 See, e.g., DeCoste, “The Jurisprudence” supra, note 87, at 87: “both the process and the 
substance of appointment offend in disgracefully equal measure the principles of transparent 
government”; Kent, supra, note 104, at 96.  
209 Slayton, supra, note 86, at 246. 
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2. Accountability 
One of the articulated purposes of the reforms was to increase the 
role of MPs and reduce the unfettered discretion of the Prime Minister in 
the selection process. Based on these criteria, the reforms to the selection 
process have not achieved their stated objectives. 
(a)  Fettering of Discretion 
The process that has developed allows the executive to preserve its 
control over the selection process while maintaining that it has increased 
transparency and accountability.
210
 The government is able to control 
both the input and the output of the selection process, thereby severely 
constraining the opportunities for any external actors to influence the 
decision-making process. 
The executive is able to wholly control the inputs. It provides the 
selection panel with a closed list of candidates. The Selection Panel is not 
permitted to consider candidates outside this list. The discretion of the 
Selection Panel is further circumscribed by the length of the list which it is 
assigned to consider. The list of candidates that the government provides to 
the Selection Panel has been mislabelled as a “long list”, giving the false 
impression that there are a large number of names on this list. However, the 
so-called long list does not appear to be significantly longer than the short 
list. Since 2006, the government has refused to disclose how many 
candidates are on this list. In 2006, it did disclose that there were six 
candidates on the “long list”. In the case of the two appointments in 2011, it 
was reported that there were 12 or 13 persons under consideration.
211
 By 
controlling the input in this fashion, the government is able to shut out any 
unwanted candidates. It may also overlook other worthy candidates.  
Second, the government is able to control the output of the process 
through the composition of the committee.
212
 For the appointment of Jus-
tice Rothstein in 2006, MPs were in a minority on the advisory committee 
that produced the shortlist. Moreover, each of the four official parties  
had equal representation on the advisory committee. Since it obtained a 
                                                                                                             
210 Kirk Makin cited Professor Bruce Ryder of Osgoode Hall Law School as saying that the 
process imparted “an illusion of accountability”. Kirk Makin, “Screening process has its detractors” 
The Globe and Mail (October 19, 2011) A8. 
211 Id. (reporting that there were 12 names on the list supplied to the selection panel). 
212 Irwin Cotler and Charlie Feldman raise concerns about having parliamentary secretaries 
and ministers of the Crown on the selection panels. See Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 268. 
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majority in the 2011 election, the current government has maintained a 
majority of three members out of the five on the Selection Panel. The Se-
lection Panel is thus akin to a parliamentary committee where the 
governing party has a majority and thus is able to control the process and 
the outcome. However, in terms of both transparency and accountability, 
the operation of the selection committee is far worse than that of a parlia-
mentary committee. A parliamentary committee operates under prescribed 
rules of procedure; the selection committee does not. For the most part, 
parliamentary committees conduct their proceedings in public; the selec-
tion committee’s proceedings are completely secret. Parliamentary 
committees produce reports after their reviews of legislation or other is-
sues; the selection committee does not. 
Finally, the parliamentary hearings do not restrain the power of the 
Prime Minister either formally or informally.
213
 In 2004, Conservative 
Party members involved in the proceedings, including future Ministers of 
Justice Vic Toews and Peter MacKay, criticized the hearings as a “sham” 
because the Prime Minister’s selection had effectively been made.214 The 
same could similarly be said of hearings over which Ministers Toews, 
Nicholson and MacKay presided. At the 2006 hearing, Minister Toews at 
least stated that the goal of the hearing was to inform the Prime Minis-
ter’s eventual decision, which was to be made two days after the 
hearing.
215
 The Prime Minister reportedly watched the hearing on televi-
sion.
216
 At the conclusion of the hearing, Minister Toews encouraged 
members of the committee to forward their comments directly to the 
Prime Minister regarding their views on the suitability of Justice Rothstein 
for appointment to the Supreme Court.
217
 In the three subsequent hear-
ings, even this pretence was dispensed with and the Prime Minister made 
the formal announcement the next day. In one case, the Chief Justice an-
nounced the swearing-in dates for the new justice before the Prime 
Minister had formally appointed the “nominee”, thus demonstrating the 
pro forma nature of the hearings.
218
 
                                                                                                             
213 The National Post has written that the process allows PMs to appoint poorly qualified or 
fringe candidates without any sort of political accountability. Editorial, “A land without Borking” 
National Post (October 18, 2011) A14 (noting further that in the case of the 2011 appointments of 
Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis, the Prime Minister had not abused his privilege). 
214 Ad Hoc Committee – discussed in Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 64. 
215 Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Cf. Editorial, “Harper v. Harper” The Globe and Mail (October 4, 2012) A14 [hereinafter 
“Harper v. Harper”] (claiming that the Prime Minister treats the hearings as a “mere formality”). 
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(b)  Holding Decision-makers to Account for Their Decisions 
Accountability “is a means of making responsible the exercise of 
power”.219 It requires decision-makers to account for their decisions. In 
the judicial context, judges are held accountable through the issuance of 
reasons for their decisions. In the government context, under our system 
of responsible government, ministers are personally accountable to the 
House of Commons for the exercise of power; ministers must answer for 
all actions carried out under their authority.
220
 This is a fundamental  
precept of ministerial responsibility under our Constitution.
221
 Based  
on these understandings of accountability, the reforms must be judged  
a failure. 
To begin, the committee of parliamentarians that interviews the 
Prime Minister’s nominee has failed to meet any accountability function. 
The first failure is temporal: the time that the government has given the 
committees of parliamentarians to prepare for questioning the nominee is 
simply inconsistent with the exercise of any serious accountability function. 
This is seen in Table 2 below. In 2004, Mr. Cotler gave the ad hoc  
parliamentarians one day’s notice in announcing the government’s nomi-
nees.
222
 In 2006, Prime Minister Harper gave MPs three days’ notice; in 
subsequent hearings in 2011, 2012 and 2013, two days’ notice was pro-
vided.
223
 This is simply insufficient time for MPs to prepare for hearing 
in any serious manner.
224
 A Globe and Mail editorial stated that two days 
was not enough time to read the nominees’ judgments and any speeches 
they may have given and to prepare probing questions, and added that 
the scrutiny was needed.
225
 
                                                                                                             
219 Responsibility in the Constitution, supra, note 167. 
220 Id. 
221 Id. See also Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, supra, note 64. 
222 Carissima Mathen wrote about the 2004 hearing that “[t]he hearing clearly was not 
designed to facilitate greater involvement by the legislative branch. The one-day notice period 
strains any contrary conclusion.” Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 62. 
223 There was of course no parliamentary hearing for Justice Cromwell’s appointment in 
2008. See discussion supra, at 127-28 and accompanying notes. 
224 Editorial, “Even good judges need public scrutiny” The Globe and Mail (October 18, 
2011) A14; Sean Fine, “New Supreme Court judge prepares for vetting”, The Globe and Mail 
(October 2, 2013) A8 [hereinafter “Fine, ‘Vetting’”] (quoting Professor Kathleen Mahoney as 
saying: “How do you possibly prepare in such a short period of time?” and Professor David 
Schneiderman as saying that a longer process would be a chance to “see if people had views about 
the quality of this appointment”); “Harper v. Harper”, supra, note 218. 
225 Editorial, “Even good judges need public scrutiny”, id. 
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Table 2: Time Elapsed for Supreme Court Appointments, 2004-2013 
Judge 
appointed 
Date vacancy 
announced 
Nominee(s) 
announced 
Time elapsed 
(in days) 
Public hearing Time between 
nomination and 
public hearing 
Appointment 
confirmed 
Abella and 
Charron 
February 21, 
2004 (Arbour)/ 
March 23, 2004 
(Iacobucci) 
August 24, 2004 185 days (from 
date of Arbour’s 
announcement) 
August 25, 2004 1 day August 27, 2004 
Rothstein August 3, 2005 February 23, 
2006 
205 days February 27, 
2006 
4 days March 1, 2006 
Cromwell April 9, 2008 September 5, 
2008 
150 days N/A N/A December 22, 
2008 
Karakatsanis  
and Moldaver  
May 13, 2011 October 17, 
2011 
158 days October 19, 
2011 
2 days 21 October 2011 
Wagner May 18, 2012 October 2, 2012 138 days October 4, 2012 2 days October 5, 2012 
Nadon April 23, 2013 September 30, 
2014 
161 days October 2, 2013 2 days October 3, 2013 
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After the Nadon hearing, Justice Minister MacKay was asked why in 
each of the four hearings held during Prime Minister Harper’s tenure, the 
committee had only been given two days to prepare for the hearing. Min-
ister MacKay responded: “As a lawyer you’re very often called before 
the court on short notice, and expect to make a case.”226 This is not a sat-
isfactory explanation as to why the government has provided MPs with 
such little time to prepare for what is purportedly an important function.  
It is instructive that the American selection process which served as 
the inspiration for the Canadian reforms takes less time overall to fill a 
vacancy and much more of that time is devoted to preparation for the 
Senate confirmation hearings. In Canada, due to the mandatory retire-
ment of Supreme Court judges at age 75,
227
 some vacancies are easily 
predicted
228
 and the pool of candidates is restricted due to regional  
requirements. The Americans have no mandatory retirements and the 
President is not restricted by regional considerations, as a matter of either 
statute or convention. Despite these greater uncertainties, the American 
process works quicker and more publicly in announcing a nominee and 
giving typically four to six weeks for the Senate to prepare for confirma-
tion hearings. Perhaps in part due to the lack of time to prepare for the 
hearings, the Canadian hearings have been criticized as mere “window 
dressing”.229 
The second failure is structural. In each of the four hearings to date, 
there has been overlap in membership between the MPs on the selection 
panel and those on the committee interviewing the nominee.
230
 The 
blame cannot only be laid at the feet of the government on this issue but 
                                                                                                             
226 Sean Fine, “Nadon skates through nomination hearing” The Globe and Mail (October 3, 
2013) A3 [hereinafter “Fine, ‘Nadon skates’”]. 
227 See Constitution Act, 1867, s. 99(2). 
228 However, of the eight vacancies considered in this paper, only two (Justice Major in 2005 
and Justice Fish in 2013) announced their retirement within a calendar year of their mandatory 
retirement date. Justice Binnie retired three years before his scheduled retirement date, which could 
hardly be considered a huge surprise (it was well known that he had to retire in three years’ time so 
the vacancy was expected; it simply came earlier than might have been anticipated). The other 
resignations were well before the scheduled retirement dates and could be fairly characterized as 
“surprise resignations”: Justices Arbour and Iacobucci in 2004; Justice Bastarache in 2006; Justice 
Charron in 2011; and Justice Deschamps in 2012. The judges of the Supreme Court have provided 
the Prime Minister with ample lead time to appoint their successors to the Court in time for the fall 
session, which begins the second week of October. However, the Prime Minister has taken 
significant time to announce each nominee. See Table 2, above. 
229 Fine, “Vetting”, supra, note 224. See also “Harper v. Harper”, supra, note 218; Editorial, 
“Judging the judges” Ottawa Citizen (October 18, 2011) A10; Editorial, “Judging the judges” The 
Vancouver Sun (October 20, 2011) A16. 
230 Cf. Cotler & Feldman, supra, note 36, at 260. 
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equally at the feet of the opposition parties. Both the Liberals and the 
NDP have also chosen to put MPs on the interview committee who were 
members of the selection committee.
231
 In such cases, MPs are in the po-
sition of interviewing someone whom they themselves recommended. 
We would not expect the government MPs to challenge the Prime Minis-
ter’s selection, but we might expect opposition MPs to exercise the sort 
of accountability function that they do generally in the House of Com-
mons as opposition MPs. However, opposition MPs are unlikely to do so 
when they themselves have been part of the process. In part, they are be-
ing asked to challenge their own decisions. The answer to the question 
quis custodiet ipsos custodes — who guards the guardians? — is not sup-
posed to be “themselves”.232 
Moreover, when on occasion MPs on the committee of parliamentarians 
have been critical of various qualifications of the selected nominee, the at-
tempt at accountability has been misdirected at the nominee instead of at 
those who participated in selecting the nominee. The most egregious exam-
ple occurred in 2011 during NDP MP’s Joe Comartin’s aggressive 
questioning of Justice Moldaver regarding his lack of proficiency in French. 
Such questioning was both hypocritical and misplaced. It was hypocritical 
because Mr. Comartin had been a member of the selection panel
233
 which 
according to the Prime Minister unanimously recommended Justice  
                                                                                                             
231 This problem may be tied to the short notice given for the parliamentary hearings. In 
2006, three days’ notice was given. In each of 2011, 2012 and 2013, two days’ notice was provided. 
It is thus not surprising that the parties chose to put their representatives from the selection panel on 
the committee of parliamentarians interviewing the candidate. In 2013, when asked why only two 
days was given to the MPs to prepare for interviewing the Prime Minister’s nominee, Minister of 
Justice Peter MacKay responded: “As a lawyer you’re very often called before the court on short 
notice, and expect to make a case”. Fine, “Nadon skates through”, supra, note 226.  
232 The phrase is attributed to the Roman poet Juvenal from his Satires (Satire VI, lines 347-48). 
See Wikipedia, s.v. “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes”. The phrase is frequently used to invoke 
questions of accountability for the exercise of power. See, e.g., Martin M. Shapiro, Who Guards the 
Guardians? Judicial Control of Administration (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1988); 
Thomas C. Bruneau & Scott D. Tollefson, eds., Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic 
Civil-Military Relations (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2008); Afsheen John Radsan, “Sed 
Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes: The CIA’s Office of General Counsel?” (2008) 2 J. National 
Security L. & Pol’y 201; Arthur H. Garrison, “The Judiciary in Times of National Security Crisis 
and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? (When in Times 
of War the Law Falls Silent, Who will Guard the Guardians?)” (2006) 30 Am. J. Trial Advoc. Rev. 
165; and C. Lloyd Brown-John, Canadian Regulatory Agencies: Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? 
(Toronto: Butterworths, 1981), cited in ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy and Utilities 
Board), [2006] S.C.J. No. 4, 2006 SCC 4, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, at para. 2 (S.C.C.). 
233 “Minister of Justice Announces Members of the Supreme Court of Canada Selection Panel” 
(August 5, 2011), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_32624.html>. 
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Moldaver for inclusion in the shortlist.
234
 Mr. Comartin and the other mem-
bers of the selection panel should have explained why they recommended 
Justice Moldaver for appointment. Comartin’s blatant and hypocritical at-
tempt to score partisan political points for his party in Quebec was not lost 
on the media covering the hearing.
235
  
While Mr. Comartin’s disquiet over the French proficiency of a Su-
preme Court candidate was understandable, it was a concern that should 
have been raised in the selection panel process.
236
 Instead of hectoring 
Justice Moldaver on why he did not learn French, the proper question 
should have been why Justice Moldaver was recommended “unanimous-
ly” by the Supreme Court Selection Panel despite his lack of French 
proficiency. That was a question that should have been targeted at 
Mr. Comartin and his colleagues and not at Justice Moldaver, who cannot 
be faulted for not thinking “in his wildest dreams” that he would ever be 
a candidate for the Supreme Court.
237
 
                                                                                                             
234 Prime Minister of Canada, “PM announces appointment of Justice Moldaver and Justice 
Karakatsanis to the Supreme Court of Canada” (October 21, 2011), online: <http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/ 
news/2011/10/21/pm-announces-appointment-justice-moldaver-and-justice-karakatsanis-supreme-court>: 
“A selection panel, comprised of Members of Parliament from both Government and opposition 
parties, provided a unanimously approved list of six names for consideration to the Prime Minister 
and the Minister of Justice.” 
235 Tonda MacCharles, “Appointments highlight secret process: Questions have also been 
raised about Prime Minister Harper’s commitment to bilingualism” The Toronto Star (October 18, 
2011) A6 (calling Joe Comartin’s criticism of Justice Moldaver “a strange twist” because Comartin 
sat on the selection committee); Tonda MacCharles, “Top court accountability an illusion: Supreme 
Court judges are appointed by PM, ‘nominees’ just a show” The Toronto Star (October 22, 2011) 
A6. Cf. Tobi Cohen, “Top judicial nominees face grilling by panel of MPs” Edmonton Journal 
(October 20, 2011) A11 (reporting that interim NDP leader Nycole Turmel stated that the NDP did 
not support the Prime Minister’s decision to consider a non-bilingual judge for the Supreme Court 
despite the fact that the NDP had been part of the process that had put Justice Moldaver on the short 
list). Mr. Comartin also took an unfair swipe at Justice Rothstein in the Moldaver hearing, asserting, 
erroneously, that in the parliamentary hearing in 2006, Justice Rothstein had made a commitment to 
learn French. A review of the transcript from that hearing reveals that Justice Rothstein made no 
such commitment. Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. Justice Rothstein took the highly unusual 
step of speaking to the media to defend his reputation, which had been publicly besmirched by 
Mr. Comartin. See Kirk Makin, “Judge rebukes NDP MPs for claiming he broke vow to learn French” 
The Globe and Mail (November 2, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ 
judge-rebukes-ndp-mps-for-claiming-he-broke-vow-to-learn-french/article4248773/>. Mr. Comartin 
did not apologize for his comments. Rather, he clouded the matter by speculating that the promise 
may have come about through speaking to a third party as part of the work of the Supreme Court 
Selection Committee in 2006. It is an interesting question whether Justice Rothstein could have sued 
Mr. Comartin for libel since parliamentary privilege does not apply to the hearings. 
236 It likely was but we do not know because panel members are bound by confidentiality 
obligations. 
237 Moldaver and Karakatsanis Transcript, supra, note 84. Justice Moldaver undertook to 
learn French and two years later his efforts were on display at the Senate Reference hearing, where 
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Moreover, it demonstrates that the proper person to be questioned 
about the Prime Minister’s selection is either the Prime Minister or the 
Minister of Justice, because one of them should account for the selection 
of the Supreme Court justice. Of the six sets of Supreme Court appoint-
ments since 2004,
238
 only two provided any semblance of accountability 
on behalf of the executive. Thus, as discussed in Part II, in 2004, Minis-
ter of Justice Irwin Cotler appeared before the ad hoc committee and 
explained the basis upon which he had recommended Justices Abella and 
Charron and the qualities that they possessed.
239
 In no other case did ei-
ther the Minister of Justice or the Prime Minister explicitly articulate the 
reason why the nominee had been selected. In each of the four parlia-
mentary hearings that we have had to date, the Minister of Justice simply 
“introduced” the nominee as one would introduce any speaker, by read-
ing his or her bio.  
Only in 2006 did Minister of Justice Vic Toews go beyond the nomi-
nee’s bio to provide additional description of the nominee which may be 
taken as justification. Minister of Justice Toews said: 
Justice Rothstein is well known as a brilliant jurist with remarkable 
intelligence and great analytical skills. He is well respected among his 
judicial colleagues, works collegially, and is highly respected in the 
legal profession. His output of judicial writing is prolific, with over 900 
decisions during his 13 years on the bench. His writing is clear, precise, 
and complete. 
Justice Rothstein is known as an extremely hard worker with the 
highest degree of integrity and personal and professional ethics. He has 
been described as pleasant, engaging, and thoughtful. He is also an 
excellent speaker, and I assume that he will have the opportunity to 
prove me correct in that respect. He is known as a good listener and as 
one who seeks out all points of view with respect to legal arguments. 
He is respectful of counsel and is open to sharing his knowledge and 
                                                                                                             
he asked counsel questions in French. While some might take issue with the quality of Justice 
Moldaver’s French, it is abundantly clear that he has embraced the task of learning the language 
seriously and making his best efforts to participate in Supreme Court proceedings in French as 
quickly and thoroughly as possible.  
238 I treat multiple appointments as a single “set” because in each case they were appointed 
together. Thus, the six are (1) Justices Abella and Charron (2004); (2) Justice Rothstein (2006); 
(3) Justice Cromwell (2008); (4) Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis (2011); (5) Justice Wagner (2012); 
and (6) Justice Nadon (2013). 
239 Carissima Mathen gave Cotler low marks for accountability in his August 2004 appearance 
before the Ad Hoc Committee. See Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 62. 
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experience with law students and others. I am confident that he will 
make an excellent addition to the Supreme Court of Canada.
240
 
In none of the hearings since 2004 did the Minister of Justice answer 
any questions and in all hearings since 2006, the Minister of Justice’s 
role was described as “chair”; the Minister simply presided over the pro-
ceedings and introduced each nominee, effectively reading the nominee’s 
bio. Not only have the hearings failed in accountability, they have  
defeated accountability by shifting the focus away from the figures who 
should be held accountable for the appointment selection — the Prime 
Minister and the Minister of Justice — and onto the person who has been 
nominated. Nominees may be able to answer many questions, but what 
they cannot answer is why the Prime Minister selected them. 
(c)  Accountability Misplaced 
It is hard to imagine a “perfect” candidate for the Supreme Court. 
Every candidate has strengths and weaknesses. The hearings have suc-
ceeded to some degree in raising some of the perceived deficiencies of 
each of the candidates: the lack of French proficiency for Justices  
Rothstein and Moldaver; the relative appellate inexperience of Justices 
Karakatsanis and Wagner; and the supernumerary status of Justice 
Nadon.  
The hearings have distorted accountability by attempting to require 
the nominees to account for their deficiencies. These are questions of 
qualifications, not of accountability. It is valid to ask a judge how he or 
she will be able to function at the Supreme Court with only a year or two 
of appellate experience or without the ability to follow hearings in 
French. But these questions do not go to the critical question of account-
ability: why was this nominee chosen over other qualified ones? That is 
not a question that the nominee can or should answer. Rather, it is a ques-
tion for those who make the ultimate decision: the Prime Minister or the 
Minister of Justice. 
(d)  Unexpected Accountability: The Nominee 
The reforms have succeeded in producing accountability of a differ-
ent sort: accountability for the nominee who is about to ascend to the 
                                                                                                             
240 Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. 
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highest judicial office in the land. Supreme Court judges, whose deci-
sions cannot be appealed, have limited accountability. They are protected 
by life tenure, restricted only by mandatory retirement at age 75, and can 
only be removed in exceptional circumstances. Supreme Court justices 
are subject to the jurisdiction of the Canadian Judicial Council, and while 
there have been complaints against Supreme Court justices from time to 
time, none have ever been validated.
241
 Supreme Court judges are ac-
countable to their colleagues and they are held accountable through their 
decisions, which must be accompanied by reasons. Those decisions may 
be critiqued by academics, lawyers, ministers, parliamentarians, the me-
dia and members of the public, but Supreme Court judges are never 
called to account publicly for their decisions, other than through their 
reasons for judgment. Under our system, such attempts would be consid-
ered inconsistent with our notion of judicial independence. 
Supreme Court judges interrogate lawyers at oral argument; Supreme 
Court judges themselves are never interrogated. The public hearing for the 
nominee is the only time that future Supreme Court judges may explain 
themselves publicly. There is something humbling in requiring a potential 
justice to explain him- or herself prior to ascending to the highest judicial 
office. This is a form ex ante accountability which, while not as strong as 
ex post accountability, is a form of accountability nonetheless.
242
 
3.  Public Education 
The reforms should be judged a success in terms of achieving the ob-
jective of improving public knowledge about the Supreme Court and its 
judges. As discussed in Part IV, this objective has developed over time; it 
was not part of the motivation in the design of the process.
243
 At the 
Rothstein hearing, Minister of Justice Toews stated that “Canadians  
deserve to know more about those individuals who are appointed to the 
                                                                                                             
241 No Supreme Court of Canada justice has ever faced any serious complaint of judicial 
misconduct that raised the spectre of removal. 
242 See Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85. 
243 Writing in 1999, Jacob Ziegel argued that public hearings could serve an educative 
function for parliamentarians. See Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28, at 14: “There is also 
another reason that justifies the introduction of a separate confirmation procedure ... it will help to 
educate our elected representatives on the impact of the Charter on traditional concepts of 
responsible government and give them a better appreciation of where the line should be drawn 
between their role and the Charter’s role.” 
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Supreme Court, and we are here today to provide that opportunity”.244 
Such statements were repeated by successive Ministers of Justice in 
2011, 2012 and 2013.
245
 The media has recognized that the hearings give 
Canadians a chance to get to know the judges before they ascend to the 
nation’s highest court.246  
There has been significant media interest in the public hearings. The 
Rothstein hearing was broadcast live on CBC Newsworld, while the others 
have aired on CPAC. Many journalists attended and reported on each hearing. 
The hearings have succeeded in humanizing the judges and the process 
of judging. Canadians have learned about each of the judges as individu-
als, including their backgrounds and something about their personalities. 
They learned that Justice Rothstein is witty and good-humoured, and that 
he once worked on a railway dining car. They learned that Justice Kara-
katsanis worked in her family’s Greek restaurant and that she is 
trilingual. They learned of Justice Moldaver’s working-class origins in 
Peterborough, Ontario, of the impact of his parents on his development 
and the precipitous beginnings to his legal career in law school. And of 
course, Canadians learned about his lack of proficiency in French and his 
commitment to learn French from his brother, who holds a doctorate in 
French literature. Justice Wagner told Canadians about his family  
                                                                                                             
244 Rothstein Transcript, supra, note 177. 
245 See Karakatsanis and Moldaver Transcript, supra, note 84 (emphasis added): 
This public hearing is intended to bring openness and transparency to the appointments 
process by allowing Canadians to learn more about those individuals who will be ap-
pointed to the Supreme Court of Canada … To the two nominees, thank you very much 
for opening up about yourself and your vision of this. I think you’re going to be a great 
part of the fabric of this country. You said you and your families are so proud of your be-
ing here. I can tell you all of us are very proud. (Minister of Justice Nicholson) 
Wagner Transcript, id.:  
This public hearing is intended to bring openness and transparency to the appointments 
process by allowing Canadians to learn more about those individuals who are nominated 
to the Supreme Court of Canada ... I believe that this process is a very worthwhile one to 
gain some transparency, and let Canadians get some familiarity with those who occupy 
such important positions as those on the Supreme Court. (Minister of Justice Nicholson) 
Nadon Transcript, id.:  
This process, which was begun by our government, is intended to bring greater openness 
and transparency to the judicial appointments process by allowing Canadians, through this 
procedure, to learn more about those individuals who may be appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada, our highest court in the land. … This entire process has been very helpful 
… in giving Canadians a better understanding not only of who sits and aspires to be a part of 
the Supreme Court of Canada but also, as Judge Nadon has said, of the quality of the jurists 
that we have in this country, which is exceptional. (Minister of Justice MacKay) 
246 Editorial, “Judging the judges” Ottawa Citizen (October 18, 2011) A10; Editorial, 
“Judging the judges” Vancouver Sun (October 20, 2011) A16. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) REFORMING THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 169 
upbringing in Montreal, how he won his first legal battle at the University 
of Ottawa by convincing the administration to let him pursue his bache-
lor’s degree at the same time as his law degree, and how he was affected 
by the events of September 11. Canadians famously learned much about 
Justice Nadon’s hockey prowess, but also about his legal career and his 
work on the Federal Court. 
The hearings have revealed the work of judging in considerable 
depth. Carissima Mathen opined that the Rothstein hearing “provided a 
significant educational benefit to those who are not familiar with appel-
late court decision-making, which incidentally would include many 
lawyers”.247 While there are those who feel that much more about the 
judicial process could be revealed through the process,
248
 ultimately the 
hearings should be judged a limited public education success. 
V. TOWARDS A TRULY REFORMED SUPREME COURT  
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS 
1.  Do We Need Reform? 
There are some who believe that the appointment process that has 
served the Supreme Court well for 129 years
249
 is only in need of minor 
change.
250
 Political Scientist Nadia Verrelli has rightly questioned wheth-
er various suggested reforms to the appointment process would produce a 
better Supreme Court than we have had so far.
251
 Verrelli’s question also 
raises the possibility that reforms could produce a worse Supreme Court 
than we have had so far, or could damage the Court as an institution.
252
 
But doing nothing is also a risk to the Court. As I have shown, the cur-
rent reforms have failed to meet the promised goals of transparency and 
accountability. While this failure is certainly no fault of the Supreme 
Court or of its judges, it has the potential to sow public cynicism about 
the appointment process and, perhaps, about the Supreme Court. Writing 
                                                                                                             
247 Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 70. 
248 See, e.g., Plaxton, “The Neutrality Thesis”, supra, note 50. 
249 That is, from the Supreme Court’s creation in 1875 until 2004, when the reforms began. 
250 See McLellan, “Foreword”, supra, note 64, at 606: “The challenge for Canadians is to 
take a good judicial appointments process and make it even better.”  
251 Nadia Verrelli, “Reforming the SCC: Rethinking Legitimacy and the Appointment 
Process” in Verrelli, supra, note 20, 114, at 122. 
252 Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 71-72: “Hasty and ill-conceived 
changes may prove impossible to reverse in the event that they make the current situation worse,  
not better.” 
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in 2006, Sauvageau, Schneiderman and Taras argued that “[t]o some de-
gree, the court sits precariously on top of a volcano of  
political distrust and conflict. Although there have been long periods  
during which the volcano has remained dormant, there are times when 
the volcano threatens to erupt.”253  
Politicization of the Court would threaten its stature and its inde-
pendence. To date, the Court has benefitted from the perceived 
evenhandedness of appointments to it.
254
 We have never had a movement 
to impeach a Supreme Court judge the way that the Americans had with 
calls to impeach Earl Warren or, more seriously, to impeach William 
Douglas in the 1970s. Our judges are not seen as carrying the allegiance 
of the party of the Prime Minister who appointed them;
255
 we have no 
equivalent of Bush v. Gore.  
We should not, however, confuse stability with complacency. Lorne 
Sossin was correct when he wrote in 2008 that “[t]he system of appoint-
ing judges in Canada should continue evolving because it is out of step 
with Canada’s legal and political culture, not because the judges we have 
are unworthy”.256 Having promised transparency and accountability in 
reforming the Supreme Court appointments process, our political leaders 
should now deliver on it, lest the failure to do so cultivate contempt for 
themselves, continued loss of trust in our political institutions and a  
decline in respect for the Supreme Court.  
To begin, the government should deliver on its promise of transpar-
ency over the appointment process. It should publish a detailed protocol 
on the Department of Justice website which sets out the process of  
appointment from beginning to end. Similar guidance documents are 
                                                                                                             
253 Sauvageau, Schneiderman & Taras, supra, note 151, at 26. 
254 Writing in 1999, Jacob Ziegel stated, that “If major controversies have been avoided over 
the appointment of Supreme Court judges since the adoption of the Charter … this is largely because 
successive Prime Ministers — Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien — have shared similar constitutional 
philosophies and because the full impact of the Charter has not yet sunk in.” Ziegel, “Merit 
Selection”, supra, note 28, at 9-10. 
255 On the relative lack of partisan polarization in Canada, see generally Benjamin Alarie & 
Andrew Green, “Should They All Just Get Along? Judicial Ideology, Collegiality, and Appointments 
to the Supreme Court of Canada” (2007) 58 U.N.B.L.J. 73. 
256 Lorne Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81, at 12. There may be different 
considerations for appointments to the Supreme Court as compared to other levels of court. It is the 
court of last resort and the most visible court in the country. Conversely, lower courts are where 
most citizens would access the Canadian justice system. The different considerations are beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
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published by the Privy Council Office
257
 This protocol — perhaps to be 
entitled “Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices” — would 
include the constitutional and statutory context for appointment of  
Supreme Court justices and the information set out below. 
The proposed Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices 
would clearly set out the qualifications for appointment and the desired 
qualities for candidates. In order to promote transparency and accounta-
bility, these qualities need to be publicly articulated at the beginning of 
the process and not raised after the nominee has been selected, as Professors 
Hogg and Baudoin did in each of the public hearings to date. Moreover, 
as discussed in Part III, Professors Hogg and Baudoin were not  
consistent in the criteria that they articulated, nor was there any indica-
tion that the Supreme Court Selection Panels or the Minister of Justice 
had actually used the criteria they suggested. 
As to the actual criteria, there is no shortage of suggestions of neces-
sary qualities for Supreme Court justices. Former Minister of Justice 
Irwin Cotler articulated criteria in 2004,
258
 and it may be that the gov-
ernment has continued to use these criteria. The Judicial Appointments 
Commission in England and Wales has a detailed list of “qualities and 
abilities”.259 Academics have suggested various qualities necessary for a 
                                                                                                             
257 See, e.g., Accountable Government, supra, note 168; Canada, Guide to Making Federal 
Acts and Regulations: Cabinet Directive on Law-Making, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/ 
index.asp?lang=eng&page=information&sub=publications&doc=legislation/cabdir-dircab-eng.htm>;  
Canada, Governor in Council Appointments Guide, online: <http://www.appointments-nominations.gc.ca/ 
prsnt.asp?page=gicIntro&lang=eng>. See generally Canada, Privy Council Office, Reports and 
Publications – by Title, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/index.asp?lang=eng&page=information& 
sub=publications&doc=publications-eng.htm>. 
258 See supra, note 31. 
259 Judicial Appointments Commission (England and Wales), Starting a Judicial Career, 
Qualities and Abilities, online: <http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/application-process/qualities-and-
abilities.htm>. According to the Judicial Appointments Commission, “merit” consists of five qualities 
and abilities: intellectual capacity (a “high level of expertise in your chosen area or profession”, the 
“ability quickly to absorb and analyse information”, an “appropriate knowledge of the law and its 
underlying principles or the ability to acquire this knowledge where necessary”); personal qualities 
(“integrity and independence of mind”, “sound judgments”, “decisiveness”, “objectivity”, the 
“ability and willingness to learn and develop professionally”, and the “ability to work constructively 
with others”); ability to understand and deal with people fairly (“an awareness of the diversity of the 
communities which the courts and tribunals serve and an understanding of differing needs”, the 
“commitment to justice, independence, public service and fair treatment” and the “willingness to 
listen with patience and courtesy”); authority and communication skills (an “ability to explain the 
procedure and any decisions reached clearly and succinctly to all those involved”, the “ability to 
inspire respect and confidence” and the “willingness to listen with patience and courtesy”); 
efficiency (“ability to work at speed and under pressure” and the “ability to organize time effectively 
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Supreme Court justice.
260
 For example, Jacob Ziegel’s “wish list for the 
essential attributes of a Supreme Court judge” includes  
complete personal integrity; robust health; industriousness and good 
work habits; a sense of collegiality with other members of the Court to 
enable the court to discharge its very heavy work load efficiently and 
without unnecessary friction; an excellent intellect and fine writing 
skills to match it; a deep understanding of the Canadian constitution 
and the Charter; and of the role of law in general in contemporary 
Canadian society; and not least, keep discernment in being able to 
project the consequences of a judgment on to a broader canvass.
261
  
There may be objections to some of these criteria, but it is important to 
engage in an open discussion about them.  
There should be an arm’s-length Advisory Committee to advise the 
Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister on the appointment.
262
 As to 
the composition of the committee, the critical factor is that it not repli-
cate party strength in the House of Commons, lest it become simply 
another committee controlled by the government of the day; the commit-
tee should have equal representation from all recognized political parties. 
There is a benefit to having some non-MPs on the committee to bring 
perspectives from other areas such as the bar, the bench and the public. 
However, such representatives should not dominate the committee, be-
cause judges and lawyers have a tendency to prefer people like 
themselves, which makes it unlikely that candidates who are considered 
outside the legal “mainstream” would be considered, as discussed below. 
The Advisory Committee should be free to consider whichever can-
didates it identifies through its consultation process. It should be required 
to consider candidates submitted to it by the Minister of Justice, but it 
should not be restricted to these candidates. By submitting five to eight 
names to the Supreme Court Selection Panel, the Minister of Justice has 
                                                                                                             
and produce clear reasoned judgments expeditiously (including leadership and managerial skills 
where appropriate)”. 
260 See, e.g., Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, note 85, at 828. 
261 Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28, at 13 (citations omitted). 
262 Many favour some form of independent nominating commissions for Supreme Court 
justices. See Kent, supra, note 104, at 97; Hutchinson, supra, note 20, at 109; Canadian Assn. of 
Law Teachers, “Canadian Association of Law Teachers Panel on Supreme Court Appointments” 
(June 2005); Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, id.; Peach, supra, note 85; Devlin, Mackay & Kim, supra, 
note 85; Canadian Bar Assn., Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (Ottawa: Canadian 
Bar Assn., 2004); Martin Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in 
Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995), at 256-67 [hereinafter “Friedland”]. 
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been able to effectively control the process and minimize the role of the 
Advisory Committee. The Advisory Committee should prepare an un-
ranked short list, along with an evaluation of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each of the recommended candidates on the short list and 
the reasons for their recommendation. The deliberations and recommen-
dations of the Advisory Committee should remain confidential, but the 
procedures under which it operates should not. The mandate and rules of 
procedure of the Advisory Committee would be set out in the proposed 
Guide to the Appointment of Supreme Court Justices. 
The Advisory Committee should complete a report on its work which 
would be submitted to the Minister of Justice at the same time as the 
short list is submitted. The Report should be released at the same 
time the Minister or the Prime Minister announces the nominee. Many 
modern judicial appointments processes contain some reporting require-
ment.
263
 This is viewed as an essential element of accountability. For 
example, under the legislation creating the ad hoc Selection Commis-
sions for appointments to the U.K. Supreme Court, those commissions 
must submit a report identifying who was selected and who was consult-
ed.
264
  
The report of the Supreme Court Advisory Committee should contain 
the following elements: (1) an explanation of the mandate and composi-
tion of the Advisory Committee as per the proposed Guide to the 
Appointment of Supreme Court Justices; (2) a reiteration of the criteria 
for evaluation as set out in the proposed Guide to the Appointment of 
Supreme Court Justices; (3) a timeline of the work and meetings of the 
committee, i.e., when it was established, when and how it met; when it 
                                                                                                             
263 See, e.g., Ontario, Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee, Annual Report for the 
Period from 1 January 2012 to 31 December 2012 (Toronto: Judicial Appointments Advisory 
Committee, 2013). The Ontario Judicial Appointments Advisory Committee (“JAAC”) submits an 
annual report to the Attorney General which contains, inter alia: 
 recruitment and outreach strategy; 
 legal background of judges appointment; 
 appointments from representative groups (Women; Francophones; First Nations; Visible 
Minorities; and Persons with Disabilities); 
 confidentiality policy; 
 criteria for Appointment; 
 an overview of the process;  
 recommendations for changes; and 
 profiles of the members of the JAAC. 
264 See Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, s. 28 (U.K). discussed in Shimon Shetreet & Sophie 
Turenne, Judges on Trial: The Independence and Accountability of the English Judiciary, 2d ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 141.  
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submitted its recommendations and its report to the Minister of Justice; 
(4) a profile of the candidates that it considered: (a) number submitted 
from the Minister of Justice, number suggested by others; (b) professional 
profile of candidates: judges, lawyers or academics; (c) demographics of 
candidates for consideration: gender; race; region; linguistic; age, etc.;
265
 
and (5) an explanation of who was consulted, by office although not  
necessarily by name.  
Perhaps most controversially, I do not think that the Minister should 
be bound by the short list. We should not lose sight of the fact that statute 
vests the power of appointment with the Governor in Council, which acts 
on the advice of the Prime Minister. It is arguable that after the Supreme 
Court Reference, this power cannot be altered without a constitutional 
amendment. Even bracketing the constitutional issue, under our system 
of responsible government, it is the executive that must account to  
Parliament for its actions, and then indirectly to the electorate. 
Moreover, there is no indication that we would improve the quality 
of appointments to the Supreme Court by completely fettering the discre-
tion of the Minister of Justice and the Prime Minister. Professor Hogg 
has argued that the Advisory Committee should be dispensed with alto-
gether because it compromises this principle of executive appointment: 
“For a single, occasional, high-profile appointment, I do not think the 
government should be restricted to a short list developed by an advisory 
committee … My concern is that the dynamics of deliberation in a di-
verse committee may eliminate candidates against whom some objection 
can be made. The tendency, I would fear, is that only the safest and least 
controversial persons would achieve consensus. Such persons are often 
excellent judges, but may not always be the best person for the Court at a 
particular time.”266 Hogg cited the example of the appointments of Bo-
                                                                                                             
265 Cf. the discussion of diversity and representativeness of the judiciary in Devlin, Mackay 
& Kim, supra, note 85, and Sossin, “Judicial Appointment”, supra, note 81.  
266 Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, supra, note 49. Professor Hogg also 
expressed concerns about leaks from the Advisory Committee if too many people are involved with it. 
While this may have been a concern with the larger and more diverse committee used for the 
appointment of Justice Rothstein in 2005-2006, it was not a concern with the smaller, “closed” 
panels consisting solely of MPs used for the subsequent appointments of Justices Moldaver and 
Karakatsanis (2011), Justice Wagner (2012) and Justice Nadon (2013). On the issue of leaks from 
the committee of persons being considered, I am not particularly troubled by this for two reasons: (1) 
there is an increasing tendency for senior executive positions to be open competitions; (2) there is 
nothing unusual in the disclosure of candidates for senior executive positions. Indeed, such 
disclosure may foster accountability by allowing the media and the public to debate the pros and 
cons of different candidates. It may also assist the government in its deliberations by raising issues 
about a potential appointment such as bilingualism, a controversial past ruling, some questionable 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) REFORMING THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS 175 
ra Laskin (“[h]e would probably have been regarded as an ‘unsound’ 
candidate by an advisory committee in 1970”) and Bertha Wilson as ones 
unlikely to have been recommended by an advisory committee.
267
 Hogg 
is most certainly correct in his assessment, but I do not think that this is 
reason to dispense with the Advisory Committee; it is reason to ensure 
that the Minister of Justice is not bound by its recommended short list. 
Under our constitutional system, the Prime Minister or his or her Minis-
ter of Justice is accountable for this appointment and any reformed 
appointment process should so hold them accountable. 
The public hearings should continue but are in need of a drastic 
overhaul in order to properly serve an accountability function. To date, 
concerns regarding the politicization of the process and threats to the in-
dependence of the judiciary have not materialized.
268
  
The three key changes are: (1) the composition of the committee of 
MPs; (2) the time for the committee of MPs to prepare for its work; and 
(3) the participation of the Minister of Justice. On the composition of the 
committee of MPs, this should not include members of the Advisory 
Committee who recommended candidates for the Minister’s considera-
tion, including, in all likelihood, the candidate selected by the Prime 
Minister as his or her nominee. Simply put, including such persons in a 
supposed vetting function is nonsensical, as was seen in the incident in-
volving Mr. Comartin’s challenging of Justice Moldaver’s French-
language proficiency. 
If the public hearings are to serve a serious accountability function, 
MPs must be provided with sufficient time to prepare for the hearings: to 
read and analyze the nominee’s judgments and writings, to consider the 
analysis and critique of academics and members of the media, etc.
269
 In-
stead of two days’ notice, MPs and members of the public should be 
given at least two weeks’ notice to prepare for the hearings. 
                                                                                                             
past affiliation or, in the case of Justice Nadon, a serious challenge to his qualification for 
appointment under the governing statute. We live in an age of transparency and it is simply 
unrealistic for candidates for any position, especially high public office, to expect secrecy.  
267 Hogg, “Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein”, id. 
268 Such concerns were raised by the Bar, individual judges and others. See Canadian Bar 
Assn., Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 2004); 
Bertha Wilson, “Methods of Appointment and Pluralism” in D. Magnusson & D. Soberman, eds., 
Canadian Constitutional Dilemmas Revisited (Kingston: Centre for Public Policy, 1997) 154, at 162; 
Kirk Makin, “Top-court Judge defends bench” The Globe and Mail (March 3, 1999) A5 (Justice 
Cory); Peach, supra, note 85. 
269 Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 71. 
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Most importantly, the Minister of Justice should be questioned at the 
hearing. The hearings have likely succeeded in making Canadians more 
aware of the work of the Supreme Court and of the new justices,
270
 but 
they have utterly failed in providing direct accountability for the Prime 
Minister’s selection. The Minister of Justice should explain the process 
and, whether the nominee was selected from the short list or whether the 
Prime Minister decided to select a candidate who was not on the short 
list, the Minister would have to explain and justify this decision.
271
 
While I do not favour giving Parliament a veto over the appointment 
at this point,
272
 I do think that MPs should have more than a pro forma 
role.
273
 At present, they serve a function not much beyond staging in a 
play produced by the executive. At the least, after the hearing, MPs 
should submit a report on the nominee and on the hearing to the Minister 
of Justice and the Prime Minister for their consideration. This will slow 
down the process at a critical time and hopefully lead to more reflection 
by both the committee members and perhaps the Prime Minister and 
Minister of Justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Those who championed reforms to the appointment process in the 
1990s and 2000s promised Canadians more openness and accountability. 
They claimed they would empower Parliament and check the unfettered 
power of the Prime Minister. On these bases, the reforms must be judged 
a failure, if not worse. Instead of transparency and accountability, they 
                                                                                                             
270 I have no evidence to support this assertion; it is a speculation on my part based on my 
review of media coverage on the hearings.  
271 In his landmark report A Place Apart: Judicial Independence and Accountability in 
Canada, Martin Friedland favoured an independent nominating commission that would produce a 
ranked short list of two or three candidates. If the government did not choose from the short list, then 
it would be required to justify its choice before some sort of confirmation hearing. Friedland, supra, 
note 262, at 256-67. 
272 See contra Ziegel, “Merit Selection”, supra, note 28; Bill C-60, The Constitutional 
Amendment Act, 30th Parl., 3d Sess. 1978; Pierre E. Trudeau, The Constitution and the People of 
Canada (Ottawa: Government of Canada, 1969); Peter H. Russell, “Constitutional Reform of the 
Canadian Judiciary” (1969) 7 Alta. L. Rev. 103.  
273 See Mathen, “Choices and Controversy”, supra, note 14, at 62 (describing the August 
2004 hearing in such terms). Though no doubt inadvertently, Minister of Justice Nicholson described 
the role of the Committee at the Karakatsanis and Moldaver hearing as being “intended to bring 
openness and transparency to the appointments process by allowing Canadians to learn more about 
those individuals who will be appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada…”. Moldaver & 
Karakatsanis Transcript, supra, note 84 (emphasis added). 
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have brought opaqueness and obfuscation. Instead of addressing the  
democratic deficit, the reforms have exacerbated it. They have not  
increased public confidence in the appointment process, nor have  
they empowered Parliament. The democratic audit conducted in this  
paper concludes that there is a continued transparency and accountability 
deficit in the Supreme Court appointment process. 
Conversely, it is unlikely that the failed reforms have damaged the 
judiciary or the Supreme Court. Despite Mr. Cotler’s assertion in the epi-
graph of this paper of the link between the integrity of the appointment 
process and the independence of the judiciary,
274
 there is no indication 
that the reform process has weakened the Supreme Court or decreased 
public confidence in the high court or its judges. In terms of making  
Canadians more aware of the individuals who sit on our highest court, 
and of the work done by them and by the Court as an institution, the  
reforms must be judged a success. 
Are the reforms worth it? I do not believe we can return to the days 
before 2004 of a process shrouded in secrecy with unfettered and unac-
countable executive power over appointments to our highest court. I have 
attempted to chart a path for further reforms, which I think would 
achieve the goals of transparency and accountability without compromis-
ing the Supreme Court as an institution. Whether our political leaders 
will have the will to tackle the new democratic deficit they have created 
remains to be seen. 
 
                                                                                                             
274 Cotler, “The Supreme Court Appointment Process”, supra, note 2, at 131. 
  
 
